Invisible Barriers: Identifying restrictions affecting New Zealanders' access to the Internet by Esnaashari, Shadi
Invisible Barriers:
Identifying restrictions
affecting New Zealanders’
access to the Internet
by
Shadi Esnaashari
A thesis
submitted to the Victoria University of Wellington
in fulfilment of the
requirements for the degree of
Master of Science
in Computer Science.
Victoria University of Wellington
2014

Abstract
The Internet is an important technology worldwide. People use the
Internet for research, communication, shopping, entertainment, etc. In
addition to these benefits, the Internet provides access to dangerous or il-
legal material. Because of this, some content and services may be blocked
by governments, Internet Service Providers, organizations, or individuals.
This blocking, whether for security or for network efficiency, has signifi-
cant effects on people’s access to services and information, which may not
be considered when implementing restrictions. Although studies have
been conducted on Internet blocking in many countries, no one has yet
examined what is being blocked in New Zealand. In this thesis, we mea-
sured the prevalence of Internet blocking in New Zealand and the reasons
leading to a decision to block access to websites or Internet services. Al-
though several different tools existed, they could not be used directly be-
cause they either concentrated on a narrow range of services or did not
work in an environment where some services they depended upon were
blocked. For this reason, we developed our own tool called WCMT based
on the issues identified from previous tools. We conducted our study us-
ingWCMT in order to identify blocked websites and services in our quan-
titative analysis, complemented by interviews with key informants in our
qualitative analysis.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
”I believe there is something out there watching us. Unfortunately, it’s the
government.”
(Woody Allen)
———————————————————————————————-
The Internet is a means of communication and a source of information.
Although many people benefit from access to global communication, re-
search, shopping, and entertainment, some use it for illegal activities. Be-
cause of this, content or specific services may be filtered by governments,
organizations, Internet Service Providers, or individuals. Internet filter-
ing, which can be considered a form of censorship, is a growing concern
around the world and affects a large number of people [12].
The motivations for blocking access include politics and power, social
norms and morals, security concerns, and protecting intellectual property
rights and economic interests.
Blocking can be implemented by filtering the content or manipulat-
ing the traffic through different techniques such as packet filtering, deep
packet inspection, URL blocking, service blocking, DNS tampering, BGP
(Border Gateway Protocol) route manipulation, etc [9, 50]. Various types
of blocking, whether for security or for network efficiency, may affect peo-
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ple’s access to services and information, which may not be considered
when implementing restrictions. While many people support filtering,
others see filtering as a denial of their rights. They believe that network
neutrality should be respected [31].
There are cases where blocking goes beyond simple Internet filtering.
Some Internet Service Providers (ISPs) or organizations may alter network
traffic based on specific keywords, IP addresses, or URLs. They may pri-
oritize some types of traffic or block others. ISPs adopt different blocking
practices. Individual ISP settings may affect the performance of applica-
tions, such as Voice over IP, online games, or peer to peer sharing. This
type of traffic management is not transparent to users, and users may not
be aware that it is happening.
When these ISPs discriminate against some services for users they use a
range of techniques, such as traffic shapers, blockers, and firewalls in order
tomonitor andmanipulate their users’ traffic. Finding such discrimination
is difficult for users. Previous research has shown that some ISPs change
or block users’ traffic such as BitTorrent, VoIP, etc [71].
Many studies have been conducted to determine the level of censor-
ship done at a governmental level in different countries [74, 70, 76, 4, 18].
However, we are not aware of studies focusing on the organizational level
in New Zealand. In particular, we are interested in what restrictions are
placed on wireless Internet access provided by organizations such as li-
braries, museums, tourist organizations, academic institutions, etc. When
people use these services, it is often not clear what is allowed and disal-
lowed in terms of access to web content and access to wider services. In
addition, those organizations cannot always articulate their own policies
when asked. For example, German visitors to Te Papa have found access
to a moderate left-wing political site blocked because it was classified as
Japanese pornography [54].
In this thesis, we describe a study that addresses the question of what is
blocked and why by providers of wireless access in the Wellington region.
1.1. RESEARCH GOALS 7
This required us to develop a system calledWCMT (Web CensorshipMon-
itoring Tool) that allowed detection of both blocked content and services.
Although several different tools existed [53, 36, 38, 58, 25, 4, 1, 21, 6, 76]
they could not be used directly because they either concentrated on a nar-
row range of services or did not work in an environment where some ser-
vices they depend upon were blocked. To start our experiment we chose
Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI). OONI is a censorship
monitoring tool. Unfortunately we could not use OONI since it used Tor
and Tor was blocked in almost all of our experimental networks. There
were other issues with OONI such as giving lots of false positives and not
considering service blocking. These issues led us to implement WCMT.
We used WCMT to carry out a quantitative study of 8 providers with
a follow up qualitative study where we investigated the organizational
reasons underlying their blocking policies.
1.1 Research goals
The overall goal was to understand what and why content and services
were blocked at free wireless access points provided by organizations in
Wellington. We investigated, uncovered and analyzed Internet filtering in
New Zealand in order to make them transparent for the users and ask for
support in this area. We employed an approach that consisted of:
A. Developing a technical tool and core methodologies for the study of In-
ternet filtering in New Zealand.
B. Finding content and service blockings in different organizations.
C. Interviewing IT professionals in organizations where we experimented
our tool to identify reasons for implementing censorship.
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1.2 Thesis structure
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents back-
ground of the problem and related Work. Chapter 3 looks at the design
and implementation of our new tool. Chapter 4 looks at our preliminary
testing. Chapter 5 presents quantitative measurement of blocking. Chap-
ter 6 presents our qualitative investigation of polices. Chapter 7 discusses
blocking and issues around it. Finally, Chapter 8 gives our conclusion,
contributions, and suggestions for future work.
Chapter 2
Background and related Work
In this chapter, we start with a discussion on Internet filtering and provide
a discussion on background and related work. We also review tools for
investigating Internet filtering and use the results of this review to define
the requirements for our new tool called Web Censorship Monitoring Tool
(WCMT).
2.1 Content filtering
The terms Internet filtering [65] or blocking refers to the technical ap-
proaches that controls access to specific information on the Internet. This
action happens without the cooperation of the content provider. The rea-
sons for filtering are different. It can be for the safety of children, political,
the industry’s responsibility to keep their data private, etc.
2.2 Traffic manipulation
When the Internet was created all types of traffic were treated equally, a
concept known as network neutrality [79]. However, as the amount of In-
ternet traffic has increased, all data packets have not been treated equally,
9
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and some ISPs give priority to certain types of traffic over others, a practice
known as traffic manipulation. Network neutrality and traffic manipula-
tion are controversial topics.
Supporters of network neutrality believe that controlling Internet ac-
cess goes against the principles of the Internet. They argue that access to
the Internet is now a de-facto human right, and allowing other people or
organizations to determine which types of traffic receive priority is a form
of discrimination.
Opponents of network neutrality include some ISPs, governments, and
individuals who believe that network neutrality is harmful for both their
businesses and the health of society. In particular, they argue that band-
width intensive applications, such as video applications, use a dispropor-
tionate amount of capacity, and therefore, disadvantage simpler formats.
To counter this effect, some ISPs prioritize specific traffic and deny other
types of packets permission to pass [34].
Zdravko et al. [79] indicated that two issues of network neutrality are
capacity and traffic management. Using different network applications
has increased the use of Internet but the capacity of the Internet is limited.
When Internet use increases, the network provider’s cost will increase ac-
cordingly. Moreover, some of the network applications are very sensitive
to delay, jitter, and packet loss. For the reasons discussed above, some ISPs
prioritize specific traffic and do not permit some packets to pass. This is
the cheapest way for ISPs’ to prevent extra cost. Otherwise there is no-
body to pay the ISPs the extra costs. Providers make decisions based on
traffic type, source, and destination address and they use traffic manage-
ment techniques to block or prioritize specific traffic in order to get better
results.
The first network neutrality issue emerged in the USA in early 2000s
[66]. Both the US Telecom and cable operators blocked specific traffic. US
Telecom and cable operators blocked access to VoIP services.
Some organizations such as communication companiesmay apply packet
2.3. IMPLEMENTING FILTERING 11
changes in the SKYPE or WhatsApp in order to prevent customers from
using them. Telecommunication companies know that if customers use
these applications, they will not use telecommunication centers’ services.
Hence, these companies will lose revenues. Communication companies
may prioritize special packets. For example, they can give permission for
the pay services to go faster than free services. This is another example
which weakens network neutrality [51].
The problem affects users when the ISPs block certain types of packets
and the novice user wants to use a new application. If the novice user can-
not run the application, he/she will not know whether there is a problem
with the application or the network. The novice user may think their ap-
plication is malfunctioning which gives a sense of confusion to the users
which is frustrating.
Different ISPs have different regulations and blocked different applica-
tions. Users who wish to access the blocked application might therefore be
forced to change their ISP. But if all ISPs filter a specific application, then,
there will be no other choice for the user. In addition, finding other ISPs
will be time consuming and costly.
2.3 Implementing filtering
Implementing content filtering and trafficmanipulation has occurred through
different mechanisms such as packet filtering, DNS tampering, and BGP
route manipulation [10]. A description on each of them has been given in
the following sections [69].
2.3.1 Packet filtering
Packet filtering will happen at the routers or any other devices on the path
of the communication. They will look at the header of the packet and will
decide whether to allow or deny further passage to the packets [10]. Filter-
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ing applies in either layer three or layer four of the Open System Intercon-
nected (OSI) model [41]. The OSI model contains seven different layers,
namely, physical, data link, network, transport, session, presentation, and
application. The lowest layer is the physical layer. The highest layer is the
application layer. The action of packet filtering will be done by firewalls.
Firewalls [17] examine all traffic routed between two networks in order
to check whether they meet the criteria or not. If it does not, it is stopped.
Firewalls can filter both inbound and outbound traffic. It is used to man-
age public access to private network aswell as logging all attempts to enter
that network.
Filtering the packets in firewalls will be performed based on their source
and destination addresses and port numbers. Specific types of network
traffic can also be filtered at firewalls. Firewalls are divided into three cat-
egories. An overview of each has been given below.
Packet filtering gateways: Packet filters provide a simple level of gate-
way security. This kind of gateways drops packets based on the
source address, destination address, or port numbers. Packet filter-
ing will be applied at layer three and four of the OSI model.
Layer three filtering: Layer three filtering happens at the IP header.
This header contains information about themachine sending the packet.
If the goal is to deny access to the special host, all the information
coming in or out of that host will be denied.
The first kind of firewall refers to filtering the packet. The packet
filter will happen at level 3 of OSI model (network layer) by looking
at source and destination IP address. This kind of filtering can also
happen on the protocol field in IP header.
There are lots of techniques to trick this kind of filtering such as
spoofing, fragmenting and other ways of passing the traffic. But the
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benefit of this technique is that it is faster compared to other tech-
niques.
Layer four filtering: In layer four filtering, the data inside the IP
packet in addition to the layer three filtering will be used. Port num-
bers are retrieved in this layer. So with this ability, the filtering can
be applied not only on the IP address but also on the port number.
The problem with IP filtering is that if one IP address is blocked, ev-
ery domain name which is hosted by that IP address will be blocked
too.
Deep packet inspection firewalls: Another kind of filtering is through deep
packet inspection (DPI). This method is stateful inspection plus visi-
bility to application layer. This method allows the firewall to see the
data passing through and not just the connection information itself.
DPI can be used against buffer overflow attacks, denial of service
attacks, intrusions, and worms.
Although DPI is very useful for Internet management, it has an effect
on network neutrality and it reduces the openness of the Internet.
Most of ISPs use DPI for advertisement, quality of services, copy-
right enforcement, etc. Most of the governments also use DPI for the
purpose of surveillance and censorship.
DPI helps when a client connects to a webserver and wants to propa-
gate a worm or when a website tries to install malware on the system
via HTTP session.
Application level firewalls: This kind of firewall is far more secure com-
pared to the other kinds. In this kind of filtering, there is no need for
a general purpose mechanism to let many different kinds of traffic
pass or deny. In contrast a special code can be used for each special
application. In this kind of filtering there is no need to be worried
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about different conflicting rules in the firewall as well as holes in
thousands of hosts offering nominally secure services. In contrast to
the others, this kind of filtering is very easy in terms of working with
the logs and controlling the input and output traffic.
These firewalls are used by users in order to enable them to use a
proxy to communicate with secure systems. It also hides valuable
data and servers from potential attackers. In a nutshell these kinds
of firewalls are very easy for users to work with.
2.3.2 DNS tampering
The Domain Name Service (DNS) is used to translate the URL address to
the IP address so that computers can communicate with each other. DNS
tampering makes inaccessible all the services offered by a specific domain
name. These services could be web access, chat, or any kind of files that
the user has requested from the server. The effect of DNS tampering is
very similar to the effect of IP filtering. One of the examples of using this
kind of filtering is that when a request from a client is received, it will be
redirected to the server under control of censorship instead of providing
the user with the correct IP address. China is one of the countries using
DNS tampering in the ”Great Firewall of China”. This practice prevents
access to websites which they may find objectionable.
2.3.3 BGP route manipulation
Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is an inter-domain routing protocol used
for global routing at the level of Autonomous Systems (ASes). BGP select
the route based on path, network policies and rule sets. Routers on the
Internet change BGP information to find out the available path for send-
ing the packets. Routers also use this information for updating their for-
warding tables. By disabling the routing process on the border routers or
overwhelming BGP, a large portion of network will be affected or even
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unreachable. This technique was used by Egypt and Libya. At the time
of black out the government of Egypt and Libya completely cut off all
routers.
2.4 Effects of content filtering and traffic manip-
ulation
There are different strategies which can be used to implement Internet cen-
sorship. Different countries have different rules for implementing their
filtering. Figure 2.1 shows three different possible zones where filtering
could take place, for example, on individuals’ computers, organizations,
ISPs, or backbone. Depending on the location it is applied to, it will have
an effect on different numbers of people. For example, if filtering is ap-
plied to the backbone, it affects the entire country. If it is applied at the
organization or ISP level, it affects that portion of the network. If it is ap-
plied at the individual level, it affects that specific computer. A description
of each level is given below [2].
2.4.1 Internet backbone
The blocking practice may happen at the backbone. This method of fil-
tering will affect the entire country. International gateways are the places
where this level of filtering will be applied.
2.4.2 Internet service providers
Most of the filtering that governments intend to apply will be conducted
through Internet Service Providers. It depends on the ISPs to select filter-
ing methods.
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Figure 2.1
Different placement zones of censorship
2.4.3 Organizations
Some organizations have their own internal objectives and accessibility
for their users. In this situation, the organization will use its own filtering
method. For example, there are different rules for places such as compa-
nies, government organizations, schools and cyber cafes.
2.4.4 Individual computers
The restriction can be applied to individual computers. Censorship can
happen through installing filtering software on a specific machine. There
are different kinds of applications for parents for the purpose of control-
ling and monitoring [42]. These applications can do content blocking.
Some of these applications are Net Nany 2.0, AVG family safety, K9 Web
protection browser, etc.
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These applications are different in their operations. For example, by
using Net Nanny, parents would operate like traditional content blocking
censorship. By using AVG Family safety, parents can monitor the web
activity of their children. By using K9 web protection browser, the content
of the porn and malware websites will be blocked.
2.5 Circumvention techniques to bypass censor-
ship
When content blocking happens, the original version of the blocked con-
tent is not removed from the Internet. There are different Internet cen-
sorship circumvention technologies by which accessing blocked content
would be possible. Some people use circumvention tools to pass the fil-
tering and gain access to the content. But the others cannot use the same
tools. There are different techniques to circumvent [73] filtering such as
mirroring, additional DNS, changing IP address, the port number, and
search engines which has been briefly explained below.
Mirroring: Mirroring refers to a techniquewhichmakes the contents avail-
able from different sources. Mirroring technique is helpful for by-
passing IP filtering, DNS tampering, and filtering HTTP proxies. If
users intend to use this technique, they should know the address of
the mirrors.
Additional Domain Names: Additional Domain Names refer to the tech-
nique in which different domain names point to the same content.
This technique is helpful for bypassing the DNS tampering and fil-
tering HTTP proxies. If users decide to use this technique, they need
to know the address of the DNS.
Changing IP address: In changing IP address technique, the IP address
should change several times a day. Therefore, it is a sophisticated
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technical task in order to bypass censorship.
Port changing: Port changing refers to changing the port number in order
to bypass layer four filtering as well as filtering HTTP proxies. By
using this technique, user will achieve the content through different
port numbers.
Search engines: Search engines can be used in order to circumvent cen-
sorship. For example, Google has a feature calledGoogle cachewhich
can be used to achieve the cache version of the blocked content.
Proxy server: One of the very commonways to bypass censorship is using
a computer outside of the country as a proxy server. It is easy for
a computer to work as a proxy. Psiphon [48] can be used by any
computer outside the border of censoring countries. By using this
software the computer can work as a proxy for the other computers
within the censoring territory.
VPN server: The other way to bypass censorship is through using a vir-
tual private network (VPN) [24]. VPNs provide secure data trans-
mission across the Internet. There are different VPN servers around
the world. These numerous VPN servers will allow users to connect
anonymously with different IP addresses.
Email: There are other techniques for gaining the desired censored con-
tent. For example when the user does not have access to specific
content, he/she can send an email to www@web2mail.com [23] and
the content will be provided through email.
TOR (The Onion Router) [37] is an example of a circumvention tool. It
is an online anonymity system which conceals a user’s location by rout-
ing the client’s traffic through a network of servers. This means that peo-
ple who conduct traffic analysis or censorship will not understand client’s
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activities such as visiting the web sites, online posts, and other commu-
nication forms. Anonymity tools like Tor aim to protect users’ personal
freedom and privacy.
There are other systems for the purpose of bypassing filtering, such as
Freegate [19], Ultrasurf [57], and Psiphon [48]. All of these systems allow
the user to be connected to one proxy outside the territory of censorship
in order to gain the desired content. There are other approaches to circum-
vent censorship such as semantic overlay network [67]. Backes et al. [67]
have used clouds in order to provide anonymity instead of using peers.
2.6 Related work
Free and open access to the Internet is an increasingly important topic.
Many studies have recently been conducted in order to detect whether
Internet content is being blocked or manipulated.
John-Paul Verkamp et al. [74] studied censorship in 11 countries around
the world namely China, Bahrain, Malaysia, South Korea, Bangladesh,
Thailand, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Russia, India, and Turkey. They used Planet
Lab nodes [44] in the countries where these nodes were available. And in
other countries where Planet Lab nodes were not available, they recruited
volunteers through their personal contacts. They have found that different
countries use different techniques for implementing censorship. For ex-
ample, censorship at DNS level was used byMalaysia, Russia, and Turkey.
They tested other ways of implementing censorship such as censorship at
IP address which is used by China and Saudi Arabia. The other countries
in their test were doing censorship using IPs, URLs, or keywords. They
tested to check whether the URLs were accessible or not through using in-
dividual computers and Planet Lab nodes. For each website they tried to
perform DNS resolution in order to get the IP address. If they did not get
the same result, they would know that the content was being censored.
Dainotti et al. [70] studied Internet outages which were caused by cen-
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sorship in Egypt and Libya. Their analysis was based on BGP inter domain
routing control plane data, data plane traffic, trace route measurements,
and RIP delegation files and MaxMind’s geolocation databases. The gov-
ernments in these countries shut down the Internet by disabling the rout-
ing process on critical routers or by suppressing transmission of BGP in-
formation. In order to observe the effect of blackout in these two countries
they used the Internet numbering resources by finding IP address, BGP
prefixes, and Autonomous System (AS) number of these two countries.
They used Network Telescope in order to analyze the arriving traffic.
Andreas Sfakianakis et al.[76] improved the way of detecting Internet
censorship by finding a way to differentiate network censorship from net-
work failure. They could find not only the censorship but also the technol-
ogy used to implement censorship. In order to run the experiment they
used Planet Lab nodes around the world. They ran CensMon agent on the
Planet Lab nodes. Users entered the URL plus the agent they wanted to
send the request to. They used Google alerts to insert the interested URLs
to their system. They also used Twitter [56] and Google Hot trends[20] in
order to extract the popular trends.
Another studywas conducted by theOpenNet Initiative [4]. This study
compared different levels of filtering in 60 countries. They compared the
level of filtering in political, social, security, and overall aspects. But un-
fortunately this study was not conducted in New Zealand. The result of
this study is shown in Figure 2.2 and 2.3.
The developers of this system checked it by two lists of websites: a
global list which was constant for each country and a local list which was
different for each country. They implemented their software. The software
designed to query the lists of URLs was prepared for a specific country.
The list was accessed over HTTP both in a country with Internet filtering
and a country with no filtering. Then the data gathered from the country
with no filtering was compared with the data from the country with fil-
tering. They tried to distinguish the connectivity errors from intentional
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Figure 2.2
Meta-analysis of international surveys of filtering (1)[4]
tampering. This study illustrated that the countries with more filtering
were China, Cuba, Myanmar (Burma), Oman, South Korea, Sudan, Syria,
Tunisia, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, and
Yemen.
Freedom House who studied censorship in 47 countries [18] demon-
strated that Internet censorship was growing in many countries. Their
study also proved that with the improvement of the methods of control-
ling the Internet, it was more sophisticated to pinpoint censorship. They
concluded that different attacks against bloggers, political surveillance,
manipulation of web content, and restrictive laws regulating speech on-
line were threats to Internet freedom. They divided the level of censorship
to four levels, namely free, partly free, not free, and no data as shown in
Figure 2.4 [18]. Green color is showing free. Yellow color is showing partly
free. Purple color is showing not free. Gray color is showing that there is
no data for that area.
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Figure 2.3
Meta-analysis of international surveys of filtering (2)[4]
Marcel Dischinger et al. [72] studied BitTorrent traffic over 17 weeks by
47300 end users in 1987 ISPs. They found that ISPs in countries like USA
and Singapore blocked uploaded BitTorrent traffic more than other coun-
tries. It was their first step toward making transparency for users. BitTor-
rent which is a popular peer to peer file sharing protocol uses a large por-
tion of data bytes over the Internet which is costly for the ISPs. Therefore,
ISPs used different strategies to reduce the generated BitTorrent traffic by
users.
Marcel Dischinger et al. [71] studied ISPs’ performances and found
that high packet loss and jitter had an effect on the transport protocols
that relied on round trip times and consequently on the performance of
the ISPs. Also real time application such as VoIP application would be af-
fected from large queue size that ISPs set for their traffic settings. They
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Figure 2.4
A global assessment of Internet and digital media [18]
also showed that when BitTorrent application was used by VoIP applica-
tion in the same shared bandwidth, VoIP applications’ performance would
get affected. It made another problem for those real time applications such
as VoIP applications. Hence, the ISPs would change the settings and give
the prioritization to specific traffic. There are other ways ISPs use when
they aim to manipulate traffic such as rate limiting, message dropping, or
altering the content.
In order to compare performance of different ISPs, Srikanth Sundarean
et al. [78] studied different ISPs and prepared the table depicted in Figure
2.5 [78]. Each of these metrics was important for specific applications. If
different ISPs are compared based on these metrics, then users will be able
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to select ISPs based on their requirements and the application they have
used more.
Figure 2.5
Performance metrics for the network nutrition label [78]
Srikanth Sundarean et al. [77] checked the performance from home
gateway devices. They tested the throughput and latency from 4000 gate-
way devices. They looked for reasons affecting the users’ performance
such as users’ modem and ISPs’ different traffic shaping. The difference
between their test with the previous tests was that in those studies the ex-
perimenters just checked the upload and download. Another shortcoming
of those studies was that they measured the speed once and not several
times because the previous studies ran their tool through end host and
did not take into account the effect of confounding factors. Some exam-
ples of confounding factors included home network cross-traffic wireless
network, firewall at the user side, or end host configuration.
Previous studies reveal a gap in our understanding of what is being
censored in New Zealand, who performs censorship in New Zealand, and
what the reason for performing Internet censorship is. In the following
sections we review filtering in New Zealand and free Internet providers in
Wellington, New Zealand.
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2.7 Filtering in New Zealand
Based on 2012NewZealand national census, the population of NewZealand
was 4,449,768 as on Thursday, 20 Dec 2012 at 10:03:54 am [46]. A study [55]
conducted by the Ministry of Social Development showed that in 2006, 66
percent of households had access to the Internet. The percentage increased
from 43 percent in 2001 to 66 percent in 2006. In December 2009, 75 percent
of households had Internet access at home which is another increase from
66 percent in 2006. The Internet is provided by around 70 ISPs in New
Zealand [30]. The most popular ISPs in New Zealand are TelstraClear,
Vodafone, and Telecom.
In New Zealand the Film, Video, and Publication Classification Act of
1993 provides a mechanism for classifying publications based on whether
or not their content is considered to be objectionable, or suited only to
specific age groups. The Act covers films, printed publications, computer
games, computer files, books, and videos/DVDs. Because the Act applies
to computer files, including images and other types of documents avail-
able on the Internet, it is possible for the Office of Film and Literature Clas-
sification to classify websites, though this happens very rarely, usually at
the request of a law enforcement agency [11].
To understand the ratio of sexual and violent material on the Internet,
Zimmer et al. [49] studied the contents of web sites and showed that 3.8%
of the materials on the Internet contained graphically sexual or violent
content. But even these small portions of web sites are easy to access.
In order to prevent the use of thesematerials, the 1996Actwas amended.
Based on the Act, if someone tries to access this content, he/she would be
considered guilty of trading objectionable material. The Act is silent re-
garding ISPs and therefore they cannot be forced to censor. Hence, ISPs
can provide these objectionable materials to users.
The New Zealand Department of Internal Affairs (DIA) [14] provides a
voluntary filtering system called NetcleanWhitebox [35] that blocks objec-
26 CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND AND RELATEDWORK
tionable content. While some ISPs have signed up for this service, others
have not. Customers whose ISPs have signed up for this filtering service
may not be aware that their Internet access is subject to this invisible form
of censorship. DIA does not reveal the list of banned sites, and attempt-
ing to access URLs is the only way to check whether a particular website
is filtered. Based on section 6 (c) of the Official Information Act of 1982,
they are allowed to leave unnamed their blocked web sites. Introduction
of the filter was controversial. Some ISPs were in favor of it, as shown in
the following quotes [62]:
Our customers would be disappointed to hear if we were not participating.
So participation for us has always been a no-brainer.( Maxnet), We informed our
customers of the trial, received positive feedback from them and it is likely we
will participate further. (TelstraClear), It’s a no-brainer for us, it’s free. (Xtreme
Networks), Telecom has announced it joined the Department of Internal Affairs’
Digital Child Exploitation Filtering System. (Telecom).
In New Zealand, filtering works through the following steps. First, the
Department of Internal Affairs (DIA) [14] prepares a list of banned sites
and their Internet addresses. Second, DIA will inform the participating
ISPs that the best way to get the Internet address of the banned sites is
through DIA’s filtering server. Therefore, when a user needs to access a
URL, their ISP diverts the request to the DIA’s server. DIA’s filtering server
will either respond to the request or refuse it. The server will respond
through DIA’s Internet connection.
2.8 Free Internet in Wellington New Zealand
There are many places [54] in Wellington New Zealand where Internet
access is offered free to their customers such as CBDfree Wi-Fi, National
Library of New Zealand, Wellington Airport, Airport Flyer buses, Te Papa
Museum, McDonald’s, and Starbucks. In addition, there are many small
and independent cafes and restaurants which provide free WiFi hotspots.
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They offer free Internet but with conditions. There are different policies
for different organizations. The problem, though is that these polices are
not clear for users. For example, McDonald’s [26] blocked gay websites
in New Zealand. The fast food chain’s Wi-Fi network was hacked by a
member of New Zealand’s gay community because it censored gay web
sites.
Wellington City Council (WCC) [60] said that the free Central Business
District Wireless Internet ( CBDfree WiFi) would be censored and it was
possible that free Wi-Fi would be restricted in the future to specific web
sites. Wellington City Council would block some websites but, other than
that, Internet is open and accessible to most Internet sites. With prioritiza-
tion in the free Wi-Fi traffic for example, users can do web browsing and
check email but they cannot use free Internet for streaming or download-
ing large files.
Philippa Bowron [61], Wellington City Council’s strategy adviser stated
that there were no plans to use content filtering to ban offensive Internet
sites. They thought that it was not the organization’s responsibility to do
censoring of the content. Such being the case, they did not have any issues
with Waterfront WiFi and in case any problem happened, the right in the
agreement would reserve the implementation of filtering.
Internet censorship has its opponents as well. In New Zealand, there
are some organizations which are against filtering [31] and they believe
that central filtering does not respect human rights. Two of these organi-
zations are TechLiberty and InternetNZ. Their opinions are discussed in
the following sections.
Tech Liberty group [5] which is a non-government group was estab-
lished to protect people’s rights on the Internet. The group is responsible
to educate users about their rights. If someone’s rights are infringed, they
teach them how to defend themselves. Tech Liberty’s main focus is to stop
filtering and it has published a number of articles regarding this matter.
Another organization which is dedicated to protecting and promot-
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ing the Internet in New Zealand is InternetNZ (Internet New Zealand
Inc.)[31]. The main goal of this charity-based organization is to provide
high performance and unfiltered access for all New Zealanders. It has
eight main policies to ensure the transparency and predictability of the
approaches taken to Internet. InternetNZ’s goal is to keep the Internet
”open and uncaptureable” but cyber attacks, politically motivated censor-
ship, and government control over Internet infrastructure are emerging as
a threat to the Internet [40].
InternetNZ believes that a centrally monitored government filtering
system is not the answer. Even though many parents assume the DIA
filtering system provides a safe environment, the objectionable material
may still be available, since filters are not always successful [28]. In Jan-
uary 2010, InternetNZ [29] asked the Department of Internal Affairs to
undertake a study of the extent of access of child abuse material on the
Internet and the most effective ways to address this problem. InternetNZ
argues that filtering is not subject to all the checks and balances that apply
to all other parts of New Zealand’s censorship regime.
Jordan Carter [32] also believes that the solution is not centralized gov-
ernment filtering. On the contrary, it will be a better solution if individ-
uals themselves choose filtering and apply that to their computers. For
example, Netsafe [3] can be used to educate and support individuals by
promoting cyber safety and champion digital citizenship.
ONI [7] compared the openness of Internet in New Zealand with a
close neighbor Australia. Australia follows the same policies and regu-
lations for Internet as many other western countries. However, the laws
toward Internet in New Zealand are less severe. Generally speaking, Aus-
tralia’s censorship regime for Internet is harsher than that of New Zealand
and other Western countries. Although Australia is going beyond the
norms of filtering compared with the more democratic states, its filtering
is not as much as or comparable with the repressive regimes that Opennet
Initiative has investigated [16].
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2.9 Different web censorship monitoring tools
This section reviews various tools proposed for doing blocking testing be-
cause we want to select the best one to carry out a New Zealand study. For
this purpose, different censorship monitoring tools based on the following
criteria were compared.
1) Is the tool an open source?
2) Is the data collected made public?
3) Is the data format used for publication easy to interact with?
4) Are the methodologies explained?
5) Is the tool able to be used by the general public?
6) Does the data collected by the tool include potentially sensitive infor-
mation?
7) What kinds of tests does the tool perform?
8) How accurate are the tests?
9) Is confidentiality and integrity of reported data being maintained?
10) What are its strengths?
11) What are its weaknesses?
It was important to find out what these tools measured because the
goal was to measure the prevalence of censorship in terms of content and
service blocking. It was important whether the gathered data was publicly
available and easy to interact with because the data needed to be opened
for other researchers. It was important that the tool be publicly available
online so that they could be easily used. Also it was important to know
whether the data gathered by the tool included sensitive data because we
did not want to make security issues for the users, so we also compared
them in terms of considering confidentiality and integrity of the data.
A number of existing tools have been developed to either detect con-
tent blocking, or identify traffic manipulation. Table 2.1 and 2.2 shows
a summary of the characteristics of these tools. They were categorized
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based on whether they were detecting censorship or whether they were
recognizing traffic manipulation.
Bismark, Netalyzer, NeuBot, Switzerland could be considered as traf-
fic manipulation detection tools. Alkasir, CensMon, Herdict, ONI, 403
checker could be considered as censorship detection tools. OONI is con-
sidered in both categories.
2.9.1 Traffic manipulation detection tools
Traffic manipulation can be applied through a small manipulation in the
header field, by completely changing the traffic, giving priority to certain
type of traffic, preventing special traffic to pass, etc. Traffic manipulation
tools, as it is clear from their names, look for manipulations in the traffic.
They aim to detect the presence of some sort of tampering with the Inter-
net traffic between the client and a server. For example, Switzerland [53]
looks for the changes, inserted or missing packets, between the client and
the server. NeuBot [36] focuses more on BitTorrent traffic and identifying
the ISPs which block BitTorrent. BISmark [58] is a tool for measuring ISP
performance. Netalyzr [25] is a relatively complete product for checking
the services. OONI [38] is a product that considered both traffic manipu-
lation and content blocking. A description on each of the tools has been
given below.
BISmark: BISmark [58] is a tester for the Broadband Internet Service. This
project was conducted by the cooperation of Georgia Tech and the
University of Napoli Federico. BISmark provides insight about the
ISP’s low level operations and is written in C, Python, Perl, and bash
script. It also has the ability to visualize and monitor traffic patterns
from users and devices inside home network, and manage usage
caps. It is provided for the public use. Its data is also online.
BISmark is a combination of network analytic tools. By using this
tool we can get an insight about ISP’s traffic manipulation, priori-
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tization, and discrimination. It provides a safe communication for
sending the user critical information. The designers used tunneling
to the router to run the test as well as collect the information in order
to maintain privacy.
Netalyzr: Netalyzr [25] is developed by an independent nonprofit research
institute affiliated with the University of California, Berkeley. Net-
alyzr has been written in Java and it shows and tests various proper-
ties of the Internet connection. This project is not an open source.
This checking includes blocking important services, HTTP caching
behavior and proxy correctness, the DNS server’s abusing, NAT de-
tection, as well as latency & bandwidth measurements, and it will
report all the findings. It runs as a Java applet on the computer. The
data is not secure at all. It will be sent to the wire without consider-
ing the integrity and confidentiality.
The problem is that this tool is not an open source but is available
for public use. If someone participates in their test, then the user can
access the collected data.
NeuBot: NeuBot [36] is another project on network neutrality. This project
is also an open source. When the program is run, it will be tested
with the server and all the details will be sent to the server. The
servers are hosted on the Measurement Lab platform. The Neubot
team is based at the NEXA Center for Internet & Society at Politec-
nico di Torino. The project manager is Simone Basso. He developed
Neubot in collaboration with Dr. Antonio Servetti, Dr. Federico
Morando, and prof. Juan Carlos De Martin.
This project is written in Python and is fully prepared from scratch
for Windows, Debian, Ubuntu, and MacOs. The data that the tool
has gathered is freely available on M-Lab. This tool also measures
the performance of the Network. The speed is checked by using
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HTTP protocol. It measures the round trip time, download, and up-
load data. It also identifies BitTorrent traffic and if the ISPs were
blocked by BitTorrent traffic. Some side effects of using this tool are:
because the tool keeps the IP of the user it will not be safe. Neither
will the data be encrypted for transferring to the server which can be
affected by attackers.
OONI: OONI [38] is a web censorshipmonitoring tool which collects high
quality data from the network. This data includes information such
as types, methods and amount of surveillance and censorship. It
shows the reasons for filtering as well as the network interface of the
filtered network. Tests in OONI are divided into two subcategories;
trafficmanipulation and content blocking. Developers Arturo Filasto
and Jacob Appelbaum are the co-creators of OONI-probe who are
from the Tor project. This application is an open source and written
in Python. The items such as URLs, keywords, IP addresses should
be given as input to the application.
Switzerland: Switzerland [53] was developed by Electronic Frontier Foun-
dation. It is an open source tool. This tool is mostly written in Python
but C also was used for speed improvements. It is implemented to
check whether the data between the network has integrity or not. It
will find the modified data packets over the IP network and inform
the user. This software has a server andmany clients. The server will
check whether any packets are dropped, forged, or modified when-
ever the clients transfer the packets between each other. The data
will be encrypted and then sent to the server but it does not send
it as anonymous. The alpha version of the software is released for
public to use. It runs through command line, so it needs a level of
expertise. The data this project collects is not available because it is
sensitive user information.
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2.9.2 Censorship detection tools
Censorship detection tools, as their names suggest, try to find if there are
contents which have been blocked by trying to access them. Censorship
detection tests are aimed at counting the kind of content that is blocked.
For example, ONI [4] and OONI [38] try to access the website from an
experiment network and compare the result with a control network’s re-
sult in order to find content blocking. 403 Checker [1] and Herdic [21]
and Alkasir [6] try to access the URLs and if they fail, it will be consid-
ered as censorship. The problem with these tools is that it relies on users’
feedback which can be false negative since users cannot identify network
failure from network censorship. The benefit of using Alkasir is that this
tool can also be used as a circumvention tool. CensMon [76] is another
web censorship monitoring tool which operates automatically and it does
not rely on users’ feedback. A brief summary of each of themwill be given
below.
Alkasir: Alkasir [6] is a censorship detection tool plus a circumvention
tool. Walid Al-Saqaf is the chief programmer of Alkasir. This tool is
different from the other circumvention tools because other circum-
vention tools route all the traffic through a proxy. They do not make
any exceptions for non-blocked websites. For example, in the traffic
of web emails (Gmail, Yahoo mail, etc.), online bank accounts, or on-
line shopping, all the details are transferred through a proxy server
which is dangerous.
In contrast, Alkasir is usedwhen you browse blockedwebsites. Hence,
this solution is more secure because the data is not transported when
there is no need for that. Furthermore, this tool does not save the
IP addresses of its users. It also prepares the list of blocked website
based on the user feedback. The tool is applicable forWindows users
and it is not an open source.
CensMon: CensMon [76] is another web Censorship Monitor tool which
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operates automatically. This tool waswritten byAndreas Sfakianakis,
Elias Athanasopoulos, and Sotiris Ioannidis in the Institute of Com-
puter Science, Foundation for Research and Technology, Hellas. It
can differentiate access network failure from censorship. It identi-
fies the filtering technique used by the censor. The writers evaluated
their system and their evaluation showed that CensMon could suc-
cessfully detect censored content.
Herdict: Herdict [21] is a tool developed by the Berkman Center for Inter-
net & Society to identify the web blockages. The test includes identi-
fying denial of service attacks, censorship, and other filtering. When
a user can’t access the content they want, a report will be sent to the
Herdicour. This application relies on users’ feedback. That is why
sometimes the results are not accurate, because some users cannot
identify the difference between network connectivity problem and
blocked websites. This data will help them monitor the health of the
Internet in real time, but it is not secure.
ONI: The OpenNet Initiative [4] is a project resulting from the cooper-
ation of four institutions: The Citizen Lab at the Munk School of
Global Affairs, University of Toronto; the Berkman Center for In-
ternet & Society at Harvard University; and the SecDev Group (Ot-
tawa).
This project tries to identify and analyze Internet filtering. This in-
formation will be helpful for informing better public policy. It is not
an open source and is not available for users to test. This is just a
research tool. Up until now, this tool has been run in 76 countries
and the results are available for each country. Because ONI relies
on users’ feedback, it will cause false positive since users will not be
able to differentiate network failure from censorship.
403 Checker: 403Access Denied Checker [1] is implemented by the Tunisian
blogger and activist Astrubal. This tool was designed to test local
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blockages. It was not developed to circumvent censorship. This tool
provides the ability for the user to check a huge number of URLs.
Then the results will be published to the public. It does not save
the IP address which makes it safe to use. The alpha version of this
application has been released.
The problem is that there is no link to this software anymore. The
first version of the software was released in 2007. But it was good for
novice users to just check their list of URLs to understand whether
they were being blocked or not.
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2.10 Tool selection
Our comparison of different web censorship monitoring tools led us to use
OONI since this tool met all of our criteria so we initially selected it. The
architecture of OONI is explained in the following section.
2.10.1 OONI architecture
In this section, we will explain how OONI works and how different parts
of OONI project are interacting with each other. In Figure 2.6, the schema
of the OONI framework has been shown. There are twomain components
in their framework namely, Oonib and Ooniprobe.
Ooniprobe is the client side of the project. The tests are run byOoniprobe
on the experimental network. Ooniprobe runs the tests through test tem-
plate. Test templates are responsible for preparing the settings for mea-
surement and also providing error handlings. In addition, it provides a
specific template for each specific test. Oonib acts as a backend component
for OONI. All the results will be collected by Oonib.
Testhelpers are responsible for implementing server side protocol. This
acts as assistance when Ooniprobe runs the tests.
There are some steps for Ooniprobe to run. First, it starts to connect to
Tor. Tor is used to have a known good channel for reporting the results.
Tor is also used as the control network because OONI’s project developers
assumes that by using Tor, they can bypass any blocking that is happening
locally. Second, it gets IP address from Tor. Third, it will send the result
as a report by getting a report ID for submitting the result. Fourth, based
on the inputs, it will chunk the inputs and run the test and update the
collector.
The methodology for OONI tests is based on comparing the results
from experimental environmentwith those from control environment. The
experiment environment refers to the network suspicious of surveillance.
The control environment refers to the uncensored network. The results
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Figure 2.6
Overview of the OONI architecture
from these two experiments are compared in order to find mismatches. If
there is a mismatch between the two results, censorship will be reported.
The differences between these two results indicate the presence of cen-
sorship. However, this may lead to a false positive due to reasons such as
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dynamic content. As another example of giving false positive in the OONI
methodology is when DNS results from two networks are compared. DNS
results are specific and predictable for lots of records but there are lots of
webpages which are geographically diverse. Comparing these two results
will again lead to false positive.
2.11 Practical issues preventing use of OONI
Our preliminary work with OONI showed that we could not run OONI in
our experimental networks, either. There were issues in running OONI in
our experimental networks. In this section, we will summarize issues we
have identified with OONI. Based on these issues, the requirements for a
new tool have been identified.
2.11.1 Issue 1, using Tor
The first issue with OONI was that, in the OONI project, the results of the
experimental network was compared with the Tor network. But Tor was
blocked in most places. Hence the tests could not be run.
Solution 1
Initially, it was thought that it would be better to make changes to the
OONI project to prevent using Tor. In this situation, offline comparing
was used between the experimental network and a network which did
not block Tor. But it was revealed that some of the content was changing
very rapidly in less than an hour. Thus, the idea of comparing the results
from a non-censored place with experimental network at a different time
led to lots of false positive. Hence, the use of a web server was suggested.
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2.11.2 Issue 2, using web server
Using a web server, the problem of finding censorship remained unsolved.
Because by using web server we just passed censorship at an organization
level but we were still affected by country level censorship.
Solution 2
To solve issue 2, using Tor at a web server was suggested. By using Tor at
web server, we passed censorship at a country level and we would have a
reliable uncensored network.
2.11.3 Issue 3, giving false positive
The third issue with OONI was that Requesthost test compared the header
and body length of the two results from control network and experiment
network with each other. If the test found any differences, it would re-
port the manipulation in the result. This was not exactly the evidence of
censorship. The difference between the lengths of bodies could be due
to having different character encodings or having dynamic content. This
solution which was used by OONI would give us a lot of false positives.
Solution 3
In order to decrease the number of false positive while calculating the
body and header length, the content of the results should be compared
with each other. It was also possible that the imagesmay have been changed.
Hence, it was essential to compare the images as well.
2.11.4 Issue 4, providing reliable endpoints for testing
In this section, there were few number of services which needed to be
checked, some services such as BitTorrent was illegal to use but legal to
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check. For this reason, there was a need to have a fake server with all
the desired service on listening mode in order to check their reachability.
Then from the client it was possible to connect to those ports at the server
to understand whether it was possible to connect to those services or not.
In New Zealand it might be true that most of the organizations did not
block the websites but they had blocked lots of ports and services.
Solution 4
It is required to run our implemented server at the Victoria University’s
server and try to connect to different ports from those experimental net-
works. This test would give us the idea about reachability on different
ports.
2.11.5 Issue 5, targeting bandwidth limitation
In OONI, the results would be sent back to the backend server. In our
context since we were faced with the limitation in using organization’s
provided data, we could not use our limited data to send the result to the
server.
Solution 5
In order to avoid using data, the result from control networks would be
saved on the Victoria University of Wellington (VUW) servers and the re-
sult from experimental network would be saved on experimenter’s com-
puter. This solution prevented the creation of any security issues for the
data.
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2.12 Requirements
Based on the limitations of OONI, we set the following requirements for
our new tool.
Requirement 1, Using web server: Since we did not have access to Tor
directly at the organizations, we had to do proxy to access the con-
tent. Therefore, we had to write an oracle web server to handle our
requests. The oracle web server had access to the network without
censorship and the Tor network and provided two control networks
for us.
Requirement 2, Reducing the number of false positives: In order to de-
crease the number of false positives in addition to what OONI relies
on as evidence of censorship, we concentrated on the contents. In our
methodology, the content and images of the experimental network’s
results should be compared with control network’s result. Differ-
ences in the results would determine censorship.
Requirement 3, Checking for service blocking: There were places where
URLs would not be blocked but they did block ports and services. It
was essential to make them transparent for users. Therefore, we had
to implement our own web server on listening mode on desired ser-
vices and try to access its open services from organizations’ network.
Requirement 4, Keeping the results separate: In order to decrease the us-
age of data provided for us in the organizations, we had to keep
the result separate in our servers in VUW and in our computer in
the experimental network and not send the data between client and
servers.
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2.13 Summary
In this chapter of the thesis, we started our discussion with an overview
on Internet filtering and provided a discussion on background and related
work. We also reviewed tools for investigating Internet filtering and used
the results of this review to define the requirements for our new tool called
Web Censorship Monitoring Tool. In the next chapter, the design and im-
plementation of our tool based on the requirements defined in this chapter
is given.
Chapter 3
Design and implementation
In this chapter, we provide an overview of the design and implementation
of our new filtering detection tool called Web Censorship Monitoring Tool
(WCMT), that addresses the problems identified in the previous chapter.
3.1 Design based on the requirements
The following requirements for our new tool were identified in the previ-
ous chapter.
Requirement 1, Using web server:
Requirement 2, Reducing the number of false positives:
Requirement 3, Checking for service blocking:
Requirement 4, Keeping the results separate: In order to satisfy the re-
quirements identified in the previous chapter, the following design
was proposed.
D1: In order to satisfy requirement (R1), our own implemented web server was used.
The web server acts as a proxy and requests pages on behalf of the
client from Victoria University open and Tor networks. This request
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goes over a separate networkwhich is not under the control of the or-
ganization doing the blocking. The result obtained from web server
would be considered as the first control network. We also used Tor at
the web server to have the second control network. It is clear that by
using Tor at the web server, the request could go beyond the territory
of the country. Getting result from Tor network gave us information
which helped identify blockings by the government that affected the
whole country.
D2: In order to satisfy requirement (R2), more investigation was needed.
It was proposed that in order to find content blocking in different or-
ganizations a focus not only on the length but also the content of the
results were needed. Our methodology was based on comparing the
overall length and content of three sources. It started to compare the
headers and body length from those three networks. After that the
body and header’s contents of the results from Experiment, VUW,
and Tor network were compared with one another in order to find
differences. The result of comparingwere saved in the third file. This
third file was used in our manual checking. If the differences were
not benign, then it would be considered as a censorship.
For more in-depth investigation, the images from three results were
compared together in terms of name and size of the images. If these
results showed any differences, this also showed evidence of censor-
ship. In order to compare the images from our three different net-
works, MD5 was used. MD5 is the actual comparison of the binary
data. Hence, if the pictures were in different formats, they would
have different binary data. If hash values of two images were the
same, it meant that they must have been identical.
With this solution, wewere trying to reduce false positives where the
content was different but the size and names were the same. Remov-
ing false positives completely was impossible but we could improve
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OONI to remove some false positives and simplify usage.
D3: In order to satisfy requirement (R3), the following check was required.
In order to make sure that there was no problem with users’ connec-
tivity in the service reachability test the connection were performed
on 22 well-known services [59]. In New Zealand, there may not be
many content blocking by the ISPs and organizations but perhaps
there are lots of port and service blockings. There are special ports
which will be used by most people and we needed to check their
connectivities. The list of these services was illustrated in Table 3.1.
In order to test these ports and services, we needed a server with all
these services on listening mode. A server with all these services will
use lots of resources from the server. Therefore, we implemented a
server which we could set it to listen on those special ports. With
this design, it was possible to try to connect to the server on these
special ports from the client side. This test helped us measure the
prevalence of service blocking.
Table 3.1
Ports and services to check
Service name Port number
FTP 21
SSH 22
SMTP 25
DNS 53
HTTP 80
POP3 110
RPC 135
NetBIOS 139
IMAP 143
Continued on next page
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Table 3.1 (finished)
Service name Port number
SNMP 161
HTTPS 443
SMB 445
SMTP/SSL 465
IMAP 585
SMTP 587
IMAP/SSL 993
POP/SSL 995
open VPN 1194
PPTP 1723
SIP 5060
BitTorrent 6881
TOR 9001
D4: In order to satisfy requirement (R4), the following design was required.
In order to make sure that our design would cover the limitation of
our context, we saved the result from our experimental network in
our local computer. We also kept the result we had collected from
control networks in our servers at Victoria University ofWellington’s
open network. Not having to transmit web page data from the client
to the server and instead manually transporting it on the laptop re-
duced bandwidth usage.
3.2 WCMT architecture
In order to satisfy the requirements, two components were proposed for
content filtering detection and service blocking detection. In this section,
we will present an overview of each of these components.
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3.2.1 Content filtering detection
Figure 3.1 consists of three basic building blocks: The Oracle, the client
and analysis engine. The Oracle is a program that will be run in the server
which has my own implemented web server and Tor installed on that.
The client is a program that will be run in the experimental network. The
analysis engine is the program for automatically defining the censorship.
The main components of the system and the process executed on each of
the components have also been shown in Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1
Overview of content filtering detection architecture
The Oracle acts as a proxy and will get the content from VUW and Tor
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on behalf of the client. The Client is responsible to get the content from ex-
perimental network and send the URLs to the Oracle. The analysis engine
is responsible to identify blocking based on the contents collected from
Oracle and client.
1) A text file containing the URLs to check is created using an editor.
2) The client reads each URL from the text file and accepts the URLs.
3) The client will send the HTTP requests to fetch the URLs from the ex-
perimental environment. The result from the experimental network will
be saved on the client.
4) Client will also send the URLs to the oracle for further investigation.
5) The client also sends whatever is returned from experimental network
to analysis engine.
6) The Oracle will accept the URLs that are sent from the client.
7) The Oracle will fetch the result from the web server’s network.
8) The Oracle will save whatever is returned from VUW on the Oracle
server and will also send whatever is returned from VUW to the analysis
engine.
9) The Oracle will fetch the result from the Tor networks.
10) The Oracle will save whatever is returned from Tor on the Oracle
server and will also send the result to the analysis engine.
11) Whatever is returned from the three networks will be compared with
each other at analysis engine.
12) Analysis engine will decide whether there is any censorship or not.
13) If there is any difference, the alarm of censorship will be set.
14) If there are not any differences, the alarm of no censorship will be set.
Analysis engine
Analysis engine is responsible to identify censorship. The methodology
for determining censorship is based on comparing the results from exper-
imental, VUW, and Tor network in terms of overall length, header length,
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body length, header content, body content, number and size of images.
The engine tries to identify censorship by comparing HTML codes
from local, web server, and Tor network. At the start, the overall length of
the two text files are compared with each other. Second, the header length
of the two results are compared with each other. Third, the body length
of the two results are compared with each other. Fourth, the content of
two headers are compared with each other. Fifth, the body content of the
two results are compared with each other. Six, the two results in terms of
size and number of images on those pages are compared with each other.
Differences in each of the above tests are considered as evidence of censor-
ship.
We did not use MD5 to compare the source HTML code received from
the URLs because we also considered the differences in the contents in our
analysis in the manual checking section in order to mitigate false positives.
Therefore, we needed to compare the two text files line by line and saved
the differences in the third file. To compare the images we usedMD5 since
getting theMD5 of the images clarifiedwhether the pictures were identical
or not.
3.2.2 Service blocking detection
Figure 3.2 consists of two basic building blocks; the server and a client.
The server was on listening mode on the desired port numbers in Victoria
University of Wellington’ servers. The client was a program that was run
in the experimental network and tried to connect to the server on those
special ports. The main components of the system and the process exe-
cuted on the components were also shown in Figure 3.2.
As depicted in this flowdiagram, the service blocking componentworked
through the following steps.
1) A text file containing the ports to check is created using an editor.
2) The client will read the port numbers and accept it.
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Figure 3.2
Overview of service blocking detection architecture
3) The client tries to connect to the server on those special port numbers.
4) The server is on listening mode in the control environment. When the
request for the connection is received by the server on those special ports,
the decision whether the connection is successful or not is made.
5,6) The result of connection reports whether or not it is a successful con-
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nection.
7) The results are sent back to the client side and saved for further analysis.
3.2.3 Content filtering detection procedure
In this section, the procedure of content filtering detection will be de-
scribed through the following four algorithms.
Algorithm 1 shows that a client will first read the URLs from the text
file. When client gets the URL, its initial task is to try to connect to that
URL at port 80 in order to detect if URL blocking takes place. Upon suc-
cessfully connecting to the URL, the client tries to fetch the URL from the
experimental networks. The client will save what it can fetch in text for-
mat in the client computer. In the next step, the client will forward the
URL to the Oracle for further processing.
Data: Random URLs
while not at end of the URLs do
Reading URL from text file;
Fetching the URL from experimental environment;
Saving the first result (ORG) to Text file 1;
Sending URL to the Oracle;
end
Algorithm 1: Client operation
As shown in algorithm 2, the URL which is sent from a client will be
received by the Oracle. The Oracle will try to fetch the URL from the web
server as well as the Tor network. The Oracle will save the results which
have collected from the web server and Tor networks for further analysis.
All these three files will be saved in text format.
Finally in algorithm 3, analysis engine tries to identify censorship. Since,
HTML codes from local, web server, and Tor network are saved in the
computer, our tool tries to compare the HTML codes as well as the pic-
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Data: Wait for request from the client
while receiving URLs from client do
Fetching the URL from VUW network;
Saving the result from oracle (VUW);
Sending URL to the Tor;
Fetching the URL from Tor;
Saving the third result (Tor);
end
Algorithm 2: Oracle operation
tures of the same URL from each organization. It is the binary content of
the pictures rather than HTML codes being compared here.The results are
compared based on algorithm 4.
In algorithm 4, the hierarchy tests will be applied on the text file to
determine the level of censorship. In this algorithm, the overall length,
the header length of the two results, the body length of the two results,
the content of the two headers, the body content of the two results, the
two results in terms of size of the images on those pages are in that order
compared with each other as proof of censorship.
In algorithm 4, we did not use MD5 to compare the source HTML code
collected from the URLs because we also considered the differences in our
manual analysis. Hence, we needed to compare two text files line by line
in order to save the differences in the third file. It would help us in the last
stage where we wanted to do manual checking in order to be sure that we
were not giving false positives.
In this algorithm H1 and H2 referred to headers of the two files. B1
and B2 referred to bodies of the two files. P1 and P2 referred to two source
HTML code collected from each URL. Img1 and img2 referred to the im-
ages downloaded from the URL which needed to be compared with each
other.
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3.2.4 Service blocking detection procedure
In this section, the procedure of detecting service blocking has been de-
scribed through the following algorithms.
Algorithm 5 shows that the server will start its job by going through
the list of ports it should listen on. Then the server will listen on those
ports. When the request for the connection comes from a clients, a report
will go to the client to make sure that the connection to that specific port
is successful.
Algorithm 6 shows that client will read the port numbers from a file to
test and then tries to connect to the server at those specific ports. When
the connection is terminated, the report will be sent back to the client by
the server.
3.3 Implementation
As mentioned before, the goal of this project was to make transparency in
terms of content and service blockings for public users. The aim was to
make this tool available for public users. Therefore, an open source pro-
graming language such as python was used. Python has many standard
libraries for simple HTTP/Web Services and it is also easy to use other
libraries from other programming languages.
In this project different libraries have been used for getting the source
code, connecting to Tor, and analyzing the files. Since we had difficulties
connecting to Tor and sending our request to Tor, we had to use a middle
library to handle the request between us from experimental network and
Tor network. Therefore, we used Polipo [45].
In terms of running the program, WCMT would be run through com-
mand line. Tor had to be started before starting WCMT. After building a
circuit with Tor network, it was necessary to run Polipo as a middle library
between experimental network and WCMT. After that WCMT were run.
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WCMT started its job by reading the URLs through input file. Input file
is a text file completed by the experimenter with the URLs we desired to
check with WCMT in our experimental network.
3.4 Summary
In the previous chapter, issues with OONI were identified and based on
OONI issues, the requirements for a new tool were clarified. In this chap-
ter, to satisfy these requirements we presented the design and implemen-
tation of our new tool, WCMT. We also presented the architecture of the
tool and our algorithms.
In the next chapter, we discuss how the preliminary test is done on our
WCMT to make sure that our tool is ready to be used in organizations.
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Data: Three txt files from organization, web server, and Tor
Result: Defining censorship level
Comparing result (ORG), result (VUW), and result (TOR);
while not at end of the result do
if Tor == Local then
Return ” No censorship ”;
else
Return org censorship or country censorship if
Tor <> Localandtor == vuw then
Return ” Org censorship”;
else
Return ”Country censorship”;
end
end
if Tor == V UW then
Return ”No censorship at country”;
else
Return ”Country censorship”;
end
if V UW = Local then
Return ”No censorship at org but maybe at country level so
check the following equation” ;
if vuw == tor then
Return ”No censorship”
else
Return ” Censorship at country level”
end
else
end
Return ”Org censorship”
end
Algorithm 3: Analysis algorithm
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Data: Http responses: H1, H2, B1, B2, P1, P2, Img1, Img2
Result: Having censorship or not
while not at end of the result do
Reading two text files;
Comparing the overall length of the two texts;
if length(p1) <> length(p2) then
Return ”Censorship due to having different lengths”;
end
Comparing body length of two results;
if length(b1) <> length(b2) then
Return ”Censorship due to having different length in bodies”;
end
Comparing header length of two results;
if length(h1) <> length(h2) then
Return ”Censorship due to having different lengths in
headers”;
end
Comparing body content of two results;
if content(b1) <> content(b2) then
Return ”Censorship due to having different contents in
bodies”;
end
Comparing header content of two results;
if content(h1) <> content(h2) then
Return ”Censorship due to having different contents in
headers”;
end
end
while not at end of the image result do
Compare images of the results;
ifMD5(img1) <> MD5(img2) then
Return ” Censorship due to having images with different
sizes ”;
end
end
Algorithm 4: Content blocking algorithm
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while There are more ports to listen on do
Reading the port number;
Listening on that port number;
while Receiving request from clients on special port do
if Connection was successful then
Return Connection was successful;
else
Return Connection was failed ;
end
end
end
Algorithm 5: Server operation in service blocking detection
while not at end of the port numbers do
Reading port numbers from text file;
Reading the server IP address;
Trying to connect to the server at that specific port;
end
Algorithm 6: Client operation in service blocking detection
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Chapter 4
Preliminary testing
The experiments were carried out by visiting free wifi access points where
either time or using data might be limited. For example, CBDfree WiFi
only allows connections for up to 30 minutes before having to log in again
or Starbucks has a limit on the amount of data that can be used in one
session. It is important to understand time performance of the tool tomake
it possible to plan the visit.
To overcome the limitation, the tool needs to be relatively fast in order
to let us test more URLs. We had to minimize the amount of fetching time.
Thus, we did it in the design stage considering our constraints. To identify
how fast our tool is to overcome the limitation of the bandwidth and time,
it is essential that we measure the fetching and analysis time through our
experimental design.
This chapter describes the methods used for the experiments. Then
it identifies the relevant hazards of our experimental design. Following
that it discusses the significance of the results and the implications for the
experiment that determine the total time taken for our experiment.
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4.1 Experimental design
This section outlines the experimental setup of the performance results.
This setup includes the description of the operating environment, proce-
dure, and the test subjects.
4.1.1 Operating environment
The client machine through which the experiment ran was a HP Pavilion
with Ubuntu version 12.10 operating system and 6 MB RAM and proces-
sor Intel(R) Core(TM) i7. The tool was installed on the HP machine. The
tool needed a Python version 2.6 which was installed on the machine. The
experiment was through domestic connection, the wireless network pro-
vided by Vodafone.
4.1.2 Procedure
The test was repeated for 30 times to control the variability in latency of
the network. We also ran the test 30 times to calculate the average time
taken to run 2400 URLs. We cleaned the cache in Internet Explorer each
time before starting to run the test. We calculated the time taken to run the
test in each round to have an average time for our formula. The experi-
menter carried out the following steps:
1) Experimenter recorded the details of time and day.
2) Experimenter started recording the time.
3) Experimenter started to run the test.
4) Experimenter saved the results to the external hard.
5) Experimenter wrote down the time when the test finished.
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4.1.3 Subjects
URLs were subject to the system. The URLs sourced from five different
categories from four country domains (see Section 4.2.1 for details).
4.2 Identifying hazards
There were risks to the validity of the experimental design. These risks
could affect the intent of the experimental setting called internal validity
as well as risks affecting beyond the experimental settings called external
validity. An overview of the identified hazards has been given below.
4.2.1 URLs
URLs were inputs to the system. To decrease the risk of the URL hazards
we created random URLs from larger population. It is worth mention-
ing that if we controlled the URLs, the results could be totally different.
To mitigate the hazards, we decided to use Win Web Crawler[64] for ran-
domly finding the URLs. This application has the ability to find the URLs
from different search engines from different countries. The topics and do-
main were the other hazards which affected the experimental design as
illustrated in the next section.
4.2.2 Topics
One important hazard to our system was the topic to be used to generate
the URLs. We did not like to be specific by choosing special words to be
used to generate the URLs. We have chosen our words based on the dmoz
categorization [39, 47]. Five different categories of words were selected to
generate the URLS, namely adults, music, news, user content, and warez.
Adults: sites related to adult entertainment and pornography.
Music: sites related to famous singers and artists.
News: sites related to different kinds of news such as sport, business, tech-
nology, and entertainment.
User content: sites related to forums and blogs.
Warez : sites related to hackers and their cyber attacks.
All the words used for submitting the queries were in English. At least
the first 300 URLs returned by Win Web Crawler were used to build the
final list of URLs for testing. The websites were double checked to ensure
that the websites had the information regarding the specified category.
A summary on the number of URLs from each categorization has been
shown in Table 4.1. Approximately 2400 URLs were sourced.
Source Inspected
URLs
Adult 700
Music 300
News 400
User Con-
tent
600
Warez 400
Table 4.1
Input URLs per topic
4.2.3 Domain
Domain was identified as another hazard to our system. We did not like
to limit our experiment to the URLs from a special country such as New
Zealand. Because free WiFi was mostly used by tourists, it was important
even more to know where the tourists came from. Hence we considered
domains from countries whose people mostly visit New Zealand. Most
of the tourists came from Australia, United States, and China [27]. We
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classified the URLs to be used in our experiment based on their domain
name in Table 4.2.
Domain Inspected
URLs
New
Zealand
900
Australia 700
United
States
400
China 400
Table 4.2
Input URLs per domain
4.2.4 Stimuli
In the process of measuring the censorship, there were stimuli. This was
the act of making a request to get the results. This process was a request
for a URL through organization, VUW, and Tor networks. Based on the
results collected from three networks, the decision was made by analysis
engine. Analysis engine compared the results based on overall length,
body length, header length, header content and body content. Moreover,
the images from the results were compared with each other to get to final
results.
A question raised here was whether the tool we had implemented per-
formed what this tool was designed to do. This was the other hazard to
our experimental design. Functional testing and monitoring functionality
were used during the process to mitigate the hazard.
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4.3 Total time taken
Formula 4.1 shows the total time taken for the experiment. The time to
our experiment ~Ti(Total) was calculated based on the time for collecting
the data ~Ti(C) and the time to analyse the data ~Ti(A). As depicted in for-
mula 4.2, the time to collect ~Ti(Collection) extended to fetching time from
three networks, local ~Ti(EN), VUW ~Ti(WN), and Tor ~Ti(TN). In Formula
4.3, 5880 was the average fetching time from local network, 6480 was the
average fetching time from University network, and 7440 was the average
fetching time from Tor networks.
Since the process of fetching from local, webserver, and Tor network
takes place in parallel, the maximum of these three fetching times were
considered as total fetching time. When the fetching finished the analysis
engine compared the results based on the analysis algorithm explained in
design and implementation chapter.
~Ti(Total) = ~Ti(C) + ~Ti(A); (4.1)
~Ti(Collection) = Max(~Ti(EN); ~Ti(TN); ~Ti(WN)) (4.2)
~Ti(Total) = Max(5880; 6480; 7440) + (30) (4.3)
~Ti(Total) = (7440 + 30) = 7470Second (4.4)
The results from 4.4 showed that the tool was fast enough to check 2400
URLs in the organization in each visit.
4.4 Summary
In this chapter we presented our performance evaluation of our developed
tool by running our preliminary test. Our goal was to overcome the limi-
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tation of our experimental networks. Our experimental networks had the
limitation in using data and time. Based on our evaluation, our design
successfully satisfied the limitation of our experimental design.
In the next chapter, we use our implemented tool to identify the num-
ber of content and service blockings in different organizations.
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Chapter 5
Quantitative measurement of
blocking
This chapter describes the methods used for identifying the number of
content and service blockings in 8 different organizations in Wellington,
New Zealand. This section explains how quantitative experiment was
conducted using the implemented tool, describes the organizations cho-
sen for the test, and lists the websites and services identified as blocked.
This chapter also explains how the environment was set up to run the test.
It further discusses experimental design, and hazards to experimental de-
sign. Then, it presents the results and discusses their significance and im-
plications. In the next chapter the qualitative experiment determines why
contents and services are blocked by providers of wireless internet access
in Wellington.
5.1 Experimental design
This section outlines the experimental setup of the content and service
blocking tests. This setup includes the description of the operating envi-
ronment, procedure, and the test subjects.
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5.1.1 Operating environment
This section outlines the environment in which the tests were run. The
experiment required the use of the following computers: the client com-
puter, the Oracle, the server, and the web censorship monitoring tool. The
client machine was an HP Pavilion with Ubuntu operating system version
12.04 and 6 GB RAM memory and processor Intel(R) Core(TM) i7. The
client side of the tool was installed on the HP machine. The tool needed
a Python version 2.6 which was installed on the machine. The server side
of the tool was run on one of the servers in open network at Victoria Uni-
versity of Wellington. Organizations were chosen based on whether they
offered free Internet or we had access to their free WiFi.
5.1.2 Procedure
The experimenter carried out the following steps for each organization to
find the blockings in URLs and services:
1. Experimenter recorded the details of time and day.
2. Experimenter recorded the details of the place that the connection
went through.
3. Experimenter started to run the test.
4. Experimenter saved the results to the external hard drive.
Censorship is a sensitive subject, and the accuracy of the results re-
garding the number of content and service blocking was very important.
Therefore, it was essential that we find out about the hazards on exper-
imental design. There were hazards on each of the components of our
Architectures 3.1 and 3.2. These hazards were risks to the validity of the
experimental design [5]. Therefore, we had to consider these hazards and
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try to mitigate them. Time, location, URLs, and services were important
hazards which had an effect on measurement. A brief description of these
hazards and how to mitigate them are given below.
5.1.3 Time
Time was the first hazard we identified in our experimental design. The
web is dynamic, and it is possible that a specific web site is filtered at a
specific time and not all the time. It is also possible that the designer sets a
threshold and if the usage of the Internet reaches that threshold, the URL
will be blocked. Administrators, by setting a threshold, actually set an
exceed point. If users exceed that point, a given effect or result happens.
To mitigate this kind of hazard, we ran our experiment in three rounds.
Initially we decided to compare the results at different times which
was a time hazard to our experiment. Hence we changed the tool by im-
plementing our web server so that we could fetch the content at the same
time. This way, we could compare the results at the same time to mitigate
the time hazard.
5.1.4 Location
Location in this study referred to the place where free Internet was offered
or where we had access to it. Each location had its own terms and condi-
tions for using the Internet which was another hazard to our system. For
example, these places were different in terms of the amount of time and
data that we could use. To mitigate the location hazard, we deliberately
chose organizations that gave us reasonable amount of time for using their
free WiFi. For example, using free Internet from airport buses were lim-
ited to the time that the experimenter was staying on the bus. Therefore,
the number of URLs which we could test were limited. This was a hazard
to our experimental design. Therefore, to mitigate the location hazard, we
omitted these sorts of places from our experiment.
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It was very important to get an idea about the number of URLs which
we could test in each of the organizations. If we assume, for example, that
each page takes around 2.45 seconds [8] to load and further assume that
we can stay for 1 hour in each place, we can probably check 1470 URLs
each time. Therefore, in order to mitigate the location hazard, we tried to
run the experiment a couple of times.
5.1.5 URLs
URLs were inputs to the system and were considered as another hazard
to our system. In order to find the data set of the URLs for running the
test, we looked at other experiments. For example, CensMon used top 10
URLs returned by Google. Heredict web used reported URLs, and ONI
published a list. ONI had two lists, namely global and local lists. The
global list was constant for each country. The local list was different for
each country. The local lists were designed individually for each country
by regional experts.
In order to run the experiment with URLs, we were interested to find
out if there was a data set for URLs and ports. We started our job with
HerdictWeb. HerdictWeb was a web censorship monitoring tool which
was available in different languages such as English, Persian, Arabic, and
Russian. In HerdictWeb’s methodology, whenever a user cannot access a
website they will report it to the HerdictWeb server. This system relies on
users’ feedback which is not safe. Users cannot distinguish between differ-
ent non-reachability reasons. For example, we tried to access the list of the
URLs which was reported by users in New Zealand. Most websites were
reachable. It showed that this data set was not reliable for this experiment.
We tried to make a data set based upon content blocked in other coun-
tries that had the same level of censorship. The closest country, Australia,
was a good start. Wikileaks [33] published the list of the blocked web sites
by the Australian government. This list contained 2395 web pages. The
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list of blocked web sites was not limited to child pornography, extreme
violence and even bestiality. On the list it showed that even the website of
Queensland dentist and dog-boarding kennel were blocked. We did not
use the data set because it was unclear of the legal ramifications and be-
sides we were not testing that we can access a clearly reasonable thing to
ban like a child pornography site. Also using Australian censored URLs
published by wikileaks would lead to a comparison study between these
two countries. It would be a hazard to our system. To decrease the risk
of the URL hazards, we created random URLs using Win Web Crawler
[65] because if we wanted to control the URLs, the results could be totally
different. Then, we had to find dead URLs and omit them to mitigate the
hazards. The categorization and domain selection were other hazards to
our measurement studies.
One important hazard to our system was the topic we used to generate
the URLs. We did not like to be so specific by choosing special words to be
used to generate the URLs. Hence, we chose our words based on the cat-
egorization in [39]. Fifteen different categories of words were selected to
generate the URLs such as racism, drugs, malicious sources, shopping,
adult, proxy, Peer-to-Peer (P2P), jokes, dating, gambling, alcohol, hate
speech, hacking, weapons, and sex education.
Domain was identified as another hazard to our system. We did not
like to limit our experiment to the URLs from any especial country such
as New Zealand. Hence, we considered domains of visitors who most
frequently visit New Zealand.
5.1.6 Services
Services were the other hazard to our experimental design. To mitigate
this hazard we chose the following list of services as they were very com-
mon for people to use.
FTP servers (port 21), SSH servers (port 22), SMTP servers (port 25),
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DNS servers (port 53), HTTP servers (port 80), POP3 servers (port 110),
MSSQL servers (port 1434), remote RPC servers (port 135), NetBIOS servers
(port 139), IMAP servers (port 143), open VPN (port 1194), BitTorrent (port
number 6881 and 4711), TOR (port 9001), SNMP servers (port 161), HTTPS
servers (port 443), SMB servers (port 445), SMTP/SSL servers (port 465),
IMAP servers (port 585), SMTP servers (port 587), IMAP/SSL servers (port
993), POP/SSL servers (port 995), SIP servers (port 5060), and BitTorrent
servers (port 6881).
5.2 Experiment
We ran the Web Censorship Monitoring Tool (WCMT) publicly from July
2013 until September 2013. We ran WCMT to collect data from McDon-
ald’s, Starbucks Cafe, CBDfreeWiFi, Te PapaMuseum, Victoria University
of Wellington, Vodafone, National Library of New Zealand, and Welling-
ton Airport.
The first phase of our collected data included fetching URLs from dif-
ferent organizations. The data consisted of contents gathered from exper-
imental and control networks.
The data was collected using 1075 URLs per site. These data were col-
lected in three rounds of visits to the sites, each time for one hour. Contrary
to what we thought, there were a lot of differences between the contents
of the pages fetched from experimental network and control networks.
Even for very ordinary websites we received false positives. Therefore, in
the second tier of our analysis we used manual checking to identify what
content was really filtered. Using manual checking was mandatory since,
in the first tier of analysis, we faced many false positives as discussed in
the following paragraphs. Getting different contents could have different
reasons which are explained in the following paragraphs.
1. There were websites whose content could not be fetched through
either Tor or experimental networks. It is possible that they could
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identify humans from applications. These sorts of websites either
did not respond or redirected the content which led to having differ-
ent contents between control and experimental networks.
2. There were other websites with dynamic content. In spite of the fact
that we sent the request for the content at the same time, the results
were different. News websites were examples of these sorts of URLs.
For example, CNN fetched through Tor brought totally different con-
tent from experimental and VUW’s Networks.
3. Some other websites ran scripts that could lead to different contents
being displayed.
4. There were websites which had different advertisements and image
names based on the localization of the data which led to having dif-
ferences in the contents.
5. Another reason was that since Tor brought the content from other
countries for which the content had been localized, it was different
from the content fetched from experimental and VUWnetworks. For
example, Google fetched from New Zealand had a different content
compared with the one brought from Australia.
In order to overcome the problems we faced, we used different solutions.
At first, we tried to identify a pattern in order to accelerate the automatic
analysis of the contents for each ISP but we could not identify a filtering
pattern for all ISPs. Therefore, for each ISP we added different techniques
of manual checking into our analysis methodology.
In the second tier of manual checking, we tried to find the contents
with zero length and tried to find the reasons for that. This tier of analysis
led to a list of suspicious URLs to censorship. Further analyses were done
by fetching them again to find out if the time hazard had an effect, if the
websites were dead, or if the URLs were blocked.
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Next, we went through the content to find some special words to de-
termine blocking. We wrote a program to check whether there were spe-
cial contents such as ”You don’t have permission to access this server, ac-
cess denied, page unavailable,” etc., which could help us spot censorship.
This solution was useful for places where blocking was transparent, and
showed their blocked webpage, but not for all ISPs. This solution also
gave us lots of false positives for places which did not have transparent
blocking page.
For different ISPs it was not clear to us which way they had chosen
to show censorship to their users. There were some ISPs which used a
combination of methods. For example, Te Papa used a combination of
transparent censorship messages, redirecting, and different kinds of error
messages at the time of censorship in different situations. Therefore, some
of the blocking could be found through following the pattern and the oth-
ers had to be recognized through manual checking.
Manual checking was time-consuming as analysis engine generated
the differences between contents fetched from experimental and control
networks and saved them on a third file. It was 1075 multiplied by 2
(1075*2) files which were not possible to go through all for each site in
our limited time. Our initial aim was to go through all the data but it was
not feasible considering time. Therefore, we went throughas as much data
as we could analyze to see if the changes were benign or not.
Our methodology was successful in determining censorship and it re-
duced the number of false positives in presenting the number of blocked
URLs. The limitation of this methodology was that it was slow due to
relying on real users for collecting and analyzing the data.
Port checking was the second phase in our methodology. With this test
we could identify the reachability of different services. Port blocking is
a policy control for site administrators. Port blocking means closing spe-
cial applications and it is assigned TCP or UDP ports. Since most of the
applications use well-known ports, port blocking is an effective way of im-
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plementing censorship. Port blocking is a simple and cheap way of con-
trolling traffic on the network. Unfortunately, many ISPs used these tech-
niques which raised debates over network neutrality. Authorities had dif-
ferent motivations for port blocking such as stopping propagating worms,
providing security for specific applications, or economic reasons for peer
to peer applications.
In this chapter, we quantified the prevalence of port blocking in dif-
ferent organizations. We did not like to emphasize whether port block-
ing was legitimate or justifiable. We, however, just intended to make it
transparent. In our methodology, we checked whether the ISP allowed us
to connect through those special ports. If, for example, client C with IP
address (IP1) from network N could connect to port P of our server, we
would consider port P as open.
5.3 Data collection
In this section, an overview on the data we collected from 8 organizations
will be given.
5.4 Blocked URLs
Different organizations have blocked different contents. In this section,
the results of content blocking for different organizations are presented.
5.4.1 Content blocking in organization 1
At organization 1 we tested the free WiFi with our first round of URLs.
In our first round of our data collection, out of 180 URLs, 114 URLs were
identified as being censored. It was interesting how organization 1 treated
the customers by providing filternet as free Internet. URLs from drug,
racism, malicious sources, adult shopping, pornography, proxy, dating,
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and anonymizer categories were blocked. Surprisingly, alcohol websites
were open. Since at organization 1, there was a transparent blocked page
shown at time of censorship, we investigated the fetched content for that
specific pattern and prepared a list of blocked URLs which is depicted in
Table A.1 in Appendix A.
Organization 1 was extreme in terms of content blocking. After using
Internet for half an hour, I received an error message stating that I used
excessive amount of data. In the message, it is mentioned that I can use
Internet again in 30 minutes. Exceeding that 30 minutes, I tried a couple
of times, but I was unable to use their free WiFi. Next, I tried a differ-
ent branch of organization 1 center. At this location, URLs from different
categories were checked in that limited time.
It was interesting that all gay websites were blocked but the gay web-
sites which were not based in NZ were not filtered such as http://www.
gay.ru/. We checkedwebsites from lesbian websites but they were open.
It was not clear to us why they did not treat similar category of URLs the
same. Even deadwebsites such as http://www.casinogamblingexposed.
com/were blocked.
Most hacking websites we checked were blocked but not http://
www.hackinthebox.org/. We were eager to understand how they cat-
egorized the URLs for blocking and if they updated their category regu-
larly?
5.4.2 Content blocking in organization 2
We tried to access 1075 URLs through organization 2 network. Almost
all of the websites were open except a couple of URLs documented in
Appendix A. Our request to the URLs we identified, was redirected or
skipped to the desired content of the site administrator.
Organization 2 was considered a paid service. Therefore, it was ex-
pected to providemore freedom to the customers. The results also showed
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that only two pornography websites were blocked. In both cases, we were
redirected.
5.4.3 Content blocking at organization 3
Table A.2 in Appendix A showed the results of content blocking test at
Vorganization 3’s wireless network. As it is shown in the result table,
the organization 3 extensively blocks students from accessing substantial
number of web pages.
Organization 3 uses a template with different content blocking catego-
rization at the time of blocking. Therefore, it was easier to identify the
blocking through processing the content. organization 3 is more transpar-
ent to their users compared to other places which redirect the page to other
websites or use network errors or lengthy timeout.
As it is shown in Table A.2 in Appendix A, the websites which had con-
tents related to proxy, malicious websites, adults, file sharing, anonymizer
websites, racism, pornography, gambling, religious, illegal drug, and dat-
ing were blocked. It was interesting to know how they used different cat-
egories for implementing censorship.
Since a list of blocked websites was not available and was not trans-
parent, implementing censorship led to categorizing the URLs incorrectly.
For example, http://www.jihadonline.org/ was blocked at the or-
ganization 3 in the ”Search Engines/Portals; Malicious Sources; Malicious
Outbound Data/Botnets,” category which is not right. This is a website
for Muslims.
Websites such as http://ww41.ourworldkids.info/ was about
children and their toys, which was mistakenly filtered at the organization
3 as a ”Pornography; Extreme,” categorization.
URL http://Torproject.org was blocked as well in the ”Proxy
Avoidance” category. Like many other web pages, this web page which
could provide students with useful information was blocked. Some of
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the websites are informative. So why does the organization 3 not allow
students to have access to the information related to Tor and just prevent
them from using it, if this is objectionable for them.
URL: http://www.megago.com/l/was blocked at the organization
3 in the category of ”Search Engines/Portals; Malicious OutboundData/Botnets”.
This URL was an informative website; they prevented users from getting
information.
URL: http://dirtyjokesinc.com/ was blocked at the organiza-
tion 3 but the URL was not actually alive.
URL: http://www.dirtyjokesinc.com/was dead but it was blocked
at organization 3 in ”Adult/Mature Content; Newsgroups/Forums; Hu-
mor/Jokes” category.
URL: http://3apa3a.tomsk.tw/c/cfg.binwas dead butwas blocked
in ”Malicious Sources; Malicious Outbound Data/Botnets” category.
URL: http://sxetc.org/was dead but categorized at ”Adult/Mature
Content; Abortion; Sex Education”.
It was interesting to know why websites from the same category were
not all blocked. For example, URL: http://friendfinder.com/ was
blocked but URL: http://www.findsomeone.co.nz/was not blocked.
It was interesting to know that organization 3 had so many sub cate-
gories as we had just categorized the websites to fifteen different topics.
5.4.4 Content blocking in organization 4
1075 URLs were fetched. Among the URLs we tested, there were URLs
which were spotted as blocked by either receiving a transparent blocking
page message, an error message, not seeing the content without any er-
ror message, or being redirected. The list of blocking in organization 4 is
presented in Table A.3 in Appendix A.
We identified the list of blocked content in organization 4 by trying to
find the blocking pattern. Other than that, there were also websites which
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were blocked but the consistent blocked page was not shown to the users.
For example, the response to the request for accessing h33tunblock.
infowhich is a ”Peer-to-Peer (P2P)” was empty.
Surprisingly, in the second round of data collection the h33tunblock.
info was shown to the experimenter. It is clear that their polices change
over time. It is also clear that they do not want to be transparent to their
users to show blocking page at the time of blocking.
The other way used by organization 4 at the time of censorship was
showing ”504 gateway time out” error message instead of showing trans-
parent block page. ”504 gateway time out” error message was shown to
us when we tried to access URLs such as http://youngtop.info/ and
http://www.torrentbytes.net/.
In our second round of data collection http://www.torrentbytes.
net/ was shown to the user but http://youngtop.info/ was redi-
rected.
There were situations in organization 4 wireless network where the re-
quest was redirected to special pages. Requesting URLs such as http://
vi5search.com/, http://xtra.co.nz, and http://pretty-pretty.
info/ led to redirecting to the administrator’s desired websites.
Requesting all gay websites was responded by transparent blocked
message but request to http://www.gaynz.com/MYSA/mysa_redir.
php?a_id=202&t=1&c=0 as an example of gay website was redirected
to the desired websites of authorities.
All the gay and lesbian websites we checked were blocked but interest-
ingly URL: http://www.gay.ru/ was not blocked as the source of this
web site was not from New Zealand.
There were some websites the content of which we could not see but
the error message was not shown either. URLs such as http://www.
marijuanareform.org/ and http://www.hackinthebox.org/were
examples of that.
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5.4.5 Content blocking in organization 5
1075 URLs were fetched. Almost all the web pages were open in organi-
zation 5. Alcohol, drugs, gambling, gay and lesbian, hacking, pornog-
raphy, hate speech, and proxy websites were open. They did not use
any transparent way of showing blocked webpages to their users. There
were situations in which the request were redirected such as http://
vi5search.com, http://xtra.co.nz , http://www.feminista.
com/, and http://youngtop.info/.
5.4.6 Content blocking in organization 6
1075 URLs were fetched in three rounds of data collection. Most of the
websites were open. We could not find any transparent blocked pages
there. Therefore, we tried to find the content with the words clarified in
section 5.2 which led to lots of false positives.
The problem with organization 6 was that the request for objectionable
content was redirected but to a variety of websites and not to a specific
website. If the request were redirect to the specific website, it would be
easier to find out the blockings. URLs from alcohol, hackings, VPN, proxy,
pornography, gay and lesbian, BitTorrent, gambling, drugs, and malicious
sources categorizations were open.
In organization 6 WiFi, a request to certain websites was redirected to
the administrator’s desired contents. The sample of blocked URLs which
led to redirections is presented in Appendix A. Interestingly, most of the
pornography websites were open except for a few of them which were
redirected.
http://kickassunblock.info/search/.kickasstorrents/was
not redirected but the error message mentioning that ”gatwway error 504”
was shown to the user. URLs such as http://www.jokes.com/ and
http://www.the-jokes.com/ which were from ”Adult/Mature Con-
tent; Humor/Jokes” category could not be seen.
5.4. BLOCKED URLS 83
http://saudieng.net/, http://www.igc.apc.org/Womensnet/
dworkin/, http://saudieng.net/, Http://www.jokes.com/, and
http://www.the-jokes.com/ were not blocked in the second round
of data collection.
The response to the request for www.prettynudists.com was the
error message ”This Domain is PARKED”. Upon my second try on a dif-
ferent day of data collection, the URL could be seen. It showed that their
policy changed over time.
5.4.7 Content blocking at organization 7
Similar to other places, 1075 URLs were tested using organization 7 free
WiFi. Most of the URLs except for a couple of them were accessible. The
websites from gay, pornography, jokes, hacking, shopping underwear, hu-
mor, drugs, malware, gambling, drugs, alcohol, proxies, nationalist and
racism categories were open. Organization 7 WiFi used redirection for the
requests to their blocked lists. The redirection was to random URLs. This
prevented us from easily finding blocked URLs. Nine URLs from pornog-
raphy and peer to peer were redirected to the desired websites of the ad-
ministrators. The list of the URLs which we requested, led to redirection
is shown in Appendix A.
Political website such as http://hizbollah.tv/ was redirected.
Some of the websites could not be seen using organization 7 free WiFi.
It was sometimes difficult to tell whether a site was blocked or simply
inaccessible for technical reasons. It will be helpful if we can ask in the
interview if it is due to excessive usage or not.
http://teenpregnancy.org/ could not be seen either, but without
any error message. There were websites that were blocked but were not
redirected to other websites either. They were just blocked. The other ex-
ample of not showing the content and not even redirecting were requests
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to URLs such as Peer to Peer. The list of Peer to peer URLs we could not
open at organization 7 is illustrated in Appendix A.
URL http://www.yahooka.com/ from drug category could not be
seen there. URL http://friendfinder.com/ from dating category
could not be seen either.
5.4.8 Content blocking at organization 8
1075 URLs were checked at the organization 8. All the racist, drug, ma-
licious, adult, pornography, gambling, adults shopping, proxy, P2P, joke,
dating, and alcohol websites were open except 14 URLs.
The request to access URL: http://3apa3a.tomsk.tw/c/cfg.bin
led to ”page not found”.
There were requests to some URLs which led to redirection such as:
http://sexual.vipzax.com/, http://risk.vipzax.com/, http:
//nude.vipzax.com/, and http://pretty-pretty.info/.
Request to http://thepiratebay.org/, http://xxx.com/ led
to an error message depicted in Figoure ??which is a transparent blocking
page.
There were situations that the requests were redirected to other desired
web pages such as a request for http://www.avizoon.com/.
The request for URL: http://tiptopteens.net/ had different re-
sponses. Upon the first try, it redirected the request to the desired web
pages of that place’s site administrator. Upon other trials, we faced errors
such as ”403 forbidden” and ”Not Found”.
The request for URL: http://teens-models.org/ was interesting
as it showed an message saying, ” You should update your media player”.
Upon the second try on the other day it was redirected.
At the time of requestingURLs such as http://ourworldkids.info/,
http://youngtop.info/, and http://www.feminista.com/, the
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requests were redirected to the Mozilla error message.
5.4.9 Summary of content blocking
In this section, we compared different organizations in terms of the num-
ber of blockings from each category. When we wanted to generate the
URLs we used topic such as racism, drugs, malicious sources, shopping,
adult, proxy, Peer-to-Peer (P2P), jokes, dating, gambling, alcohol, hate
speech, hacking, weapons, and sex education.
It was interesting that the categorizations were different in those 8 or-
ganizations. All the organizations had blocking but they were different in
terms of the number and the category of blockings. It was interesting that
some of the URLs were blocked in the first round of data collection but not
in the second round.
Out of these 1075 URLS in each of the organizations, the number of
blocked websites from each organization is shown in Table 5.1.
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Table 5.2 shows the number of content blocking per organizations.
Table 5.3 shows the percentage of content blocking in each of the or-
ganizations. It is shown that different levels of blocking existed for each
organizations. It was shown that different levels of blocking existed for or-
ganizations. For example, Organization 1 by 18.88% was extreme in terms
of content blocking followed by Organization 3 with 9.12%, and Organiza-
tion 4 with 5.58% blocking. These values were not absolute values as these
websites were sampled for a specific time. It could change every now and
then.
5.5 Blocked services
In the second phase of our data collection, we ran service blocking test in
our 8 different experimental networks to identify the ports and services
which were blocked. The result obtained from each of these organizations
is given below.
5.5.1 Service blocking in Organization 1
We ran our service checking client through Organization 1 network. The
result of service blocking test in Organization 1 is illustrated in Appendix
B. Ports FTP, SSH, SMTP, DNS, POP3, RPC, NetBIOS, IMAP, SNMP, SMB,
MTP/SSL were not open. However, ports HTTP, HTTPS, secure IMAP,
servers, IMAP/SSL, POP/SSL , VPN, PPTP , SIP, and BitTorrent were
open.
5.5.2 Service blocking in Organization 2
We tried the service reachability test with Organization 2 broadband net-
work. All the services were open. The result of the test is illustrated in
Appendix B.
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Organization Number
of content
Blocking
per orga-
nization
Organization 1 203
Organization 2 3
Organization 3 98
Organization 4 60
Organization 5 4
Organization 6 16
Organization 7 14
Organization 8 9
Table 5.2
Snapshot view of the number of URL blocking
5.5.3 Service blocking at Organization 3
The result of service blocking test at Organization 3 network is displayed
in Appendix B. As it is shown, most of the ports were open to use except
ports SMTP (port 25), RPC (port 135), NetBIOS (port 139), and SMB (port
445).
5.5.4 Service blocking in Organization 4
The result of service blocking test in Organization 4 was illustrated in Ap-
pendix B. As it is shown most of the ports we tested were open to use ex-
cept DNS (port 53), RPC (port 135), NetBIOS (port 139), and SNMP (port
161).
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Organization Percentage
of content
Blocking
per orga-
nization
Organization 1 18.88%
Organization 2 0.279%
Organization 3 9.12%
Organization 4 5.58%
Organization 5 0.37%
Organization 6 1.49%
Organization 7 1.30%
Organization 8 0.84%
Table 5.3
Snapshot view of percentage of URL blocking in each organization
5.5.5 Services blocked in Organization 5
The details of service blocking test in Organization 5 is illustrated in Ap-
pendix B. All the ports were open even those that were mostly blocked in
other organizations due to security reasons. It could be because they relied
on their customers or because they did not consider security issues. These
are questions expected to be answered in the interview sessions.
5.5.6 Services blocked in Organization 6
The details of service blocking test in Organization 6 is illustrated in Ap-
pendix B. In Organization 6 Wi-Fi all the services we tested were open
except TCP access to remote SMTP servers port 25 which was prohibited.
Because of this blocking, it was not possible to send email via SMTP. This
sort of blocking was very common because this port could be used by
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hackers for generating spam.
5.5.7 Services blocked at Organization 7
The result of port checking at Organization 7 is presented in Appendix B.
As it is shown most of the ports were blocked. It was true that Airport did
not block a lot of URLs but it blocked a lot of services. Ports 25, 53, 80, 110,
143, 443, and 993 were open and all others were closed.
5.5.8 Services blocked in Organization 8
All the services were open at Organization 8. The details of service block-
ing test in Organization 8 is illustrated in Appendix B.
5.5.9 Summary of service blocking
As mentioned before, investigating port blocking is important as it will
affect network neutrality. We need to mention that blocking is a way of
implementing censorship. Free Internet does not necessarily mean that
access to everything should be free. Rather, we propose that access to
Internet whether contents or services must be transparent to users. The
incident of port blocking in 8 different organizations is shown in Table 5.4.
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Table 5.5 shows the number of blocked services in each of the organi-
zations. Wellington Airport with 15 port blockings was extreme followed
by McDonald’s with 12 blockings. Vodafone, the National Library of New
Zealand, and Starbucks cafe did not block any services for their customers.
Table 5.6 shows the percentage of service blocking in each of our ex-
perimental networks.
Table 5.7 shows the number of organizations where each services is
blocked. This table also shows how many organizations did not block a
certain service. The most frequently blocked port were RPC servers (port
135) and NetBIOS servers (port 139) which were blocked by 4 organiza-
tions. Ports HTTPS servers (port 443), IMAP/SSL servers (port 993), and
HTTP servers (port 80) were not blocked in any organizations.
Table 5.7
Number of organization blocking one special service
Category Number of
organizations
blocked this
service
Number of
organizations
opened this
service
FTP 2 6
SSH 2 6
SMTP 3 5
DNS 3 5
HTTP 0 8
POP3 1 7
RPC 4 4
NetBIOS 4 4
IMAP 1 7
SNMP 3 5
Finished on next
page
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Table 5.7 (finished)
Services Number of
organizations
blocked this
service
Number of
organizations
opened this
service
HTTPS 0 8
SMB 3 5
SMTP/SSL 2 6
IMAP 1 7
SMTP 1 7
IMAP/SSL 0 8
POP/SSL 1 7
open VPN 1 7
PPTP 1 7
SIP 1 7
BitTorrent 1 7
TOR 1 7
5.6 Findings
In all our experimental locations, we tried to fetch 1075 URLs, and our
data showed that the practice of censorship was common among the In-
ternet Service Providers (ISPs). It also showed how differently network
administrators looked at their customers.
If we divide our experimental networks into commercial and educa-
tional groups, it would be expected that educational places such as orga-
nization 3, organization 4, and organization 8 had to have more blockings
compared to commercial ones such as organization 7, organization 6, or-
ganization 5, organization 1, and organization 2. But even a consistent
pattern was not observed among educational and commercial places. For
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Organization Number of Blocked
services per organi-
zation
Number
of service
opened
per orga-
nization
Organization 1 12 10
Organization 2 0 22
Organization 3 5 17
Organization 4 5 17
Organization 5 0 22
Organization 6 1 21
Organization 7 15 7
Organization 8 0 22
Table 5.5
Snapshot view of number of service blockings
example among educational places, organization 8 was an exception with
fewer content blockings and not having service blockings. As for commer-
cial places organization 1 was extreme in the number of content blocking
and organization 7 extreme in the number of service blocking.
If wewant to divide the experimental networks into two different groups,
namely paid and free services, organization 2, organization 3, and organi-
zation 5 will be considered as paid ones. organization 7, organization 6,
organization 1, organization 4, and organization 8 will be considered as
free services. Even among paid-service providers such as organization 3,
we did not have extreme freedom and also in free services not everything
was blocked. As an example, neither organization 7, organization 6, orga-
nization 4, nor organization 8 were extreme in terms of content blocking
except organization 1 which was extreme in terms of content blocking and
organization 7 which was extreme in terms of service blocking.
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Organization percentage
of service
Blocking
per orga-
nization
Organization 1 54.45%
Organization 2 0%
Organization 3 22.73%
Organization 4 22.73%
Organization 5 0%
Organization 6 4.54 %
Organization 7 68.18%
Organization 8 0%
Table 5.6
Snapshot view of percentage of service blockings in different organiza-
tions
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As we saw in our two ways of categorization we did not see the same
pattern in implementing blockings neither in commercial and educational
nor in paid and free services. Each of these organizations had its own idea
regarding blocking.
After studying blocking in these organizations, we identified problems
regarding practice of blocking in these studied organizations. The list of
these problems could be summarized as follows:
A: Inconsistency in classifying the blocked URLs.
B: Inconsistency in reporting blockings.
C: Changing policies over time.
The reason for this problem will be expected to be clarified in our next
phase of our data collection which is interviewing authorities in charge of
implementing blockings for experimental networks.
5.7 Summary
In this chapter, we gave an overview on our quantitative research and the
methodology for running our experiment. We discussed our experimen-
tal design and the hazards on our experimental design. We also identified
how to mitigate the hazards in order to increase the validity of our exper-
iment.
In this Chapter, we also presented our results regarding content and
service blocking in each of the organizations. We made a profile for each
of these organizations and at the last stage we compared them based on
the number of blockings in content and services.
In all the study areas, we tried to fetch 1075 URLs. Our data showed the
practice of censorship was common among the Internet Service Providers.
It also showed how differently network administrators looked at their cus-
tomers, how they changed their policies over time and how they were dif-
ferent in classifying and reporting blockings.
In the next Chapter we present our methodology for qualitative re-
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search and how we use this methodology for our interviews with IT pro-
fessionals.
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Chapter 6
Qualitative investigation of
policies
In the previous chapter, we presented our first phase of our data collection.
We provided ourmethodology for quantitative research and the results we
obtained from our content and service blocking tests.
In this chapter we present our methodology for second phase of our
data collection on how we interviewed the people and we also explain in
detail how we used the methodology to conduct our qualitative research.
We explain in detail our research design, method of data collection, our
participants, how we recruited people for the interview, what we asked,
and how we discussed the polices with them.
The goal of our qualitative investigation was to find out the reasons for
implementing filtering and the policy behind this decision. Through our
qualitative research, we hoped to clarify if blocking was applied, and if it
was because of censorship, network efficiency, or security. We also sought
to clarify whether or not it had been a proper decision to block a certain
website.
101
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6.1 Methodology for interviews
In the second phase of our methodology, we wanted to interview the peo-
ple who were responsible for implementing the censorship. After running
the test in different organizations and finding the blocked URLs and ser-
vices, we had to interview the people in charge of those organizations in
order to find the reasons for implementing censorship. The details of the
interview methodology is described below.
6.1.1 Research design
The research design for this part of study will be qualitative. Qualitative
research seeks to explore the nature of the phenomenon without any pre-
conceived hypotheses. Unlike quantitative research where the researcher
remains objective, the qualitative researcher is a human observer who ob-
serves a human condition and is historically positioned and locally situ-
ated [68].
6.1.2 Objectives of the study
Most organizations monitor and/or control the use of the Internet through
the use of logs and/or Internet filters. This monitoring/control is usually
invisible, and users are only aware of it if they try to view a website or use
a service that is blocked. However, there is little information about what
is being blocked and the reasons for that. The goal of this section of our
experiment was to identify the reasons for the types of sites and services
which were being blocked in different types of organizations. This section
intends to have a more informed policy debate about the need to block
access to Internet websites and services and its impact on people’s ability
to access the information they need.
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6.1.3 Benefit and scientific value of the project
To date no one in New Zealand has researched the restrictions in places
which users have access to either paid or free WiFi services. Moreover, to
date related policies have not been debated.
6.1.4 Ethics of this research study
Our review of literature shows that studies about blocking and censorship
were not conducted in countries where they implement excessive censor-
ship. It is highly likely that in most countries it is an inappropriate topic
to even discuss the issue. In order to make the reason for implementing
censorship transparent for the user, we needed to interview the people
in charge of those organizations. Since this section of the study involved
humans, it needed to get approval from Human Ethics Committee (HEC).
In the process of Human Ethics approval, the application for Human
Ethics was filled out by the experimenter. It was also needed to prepare
the consent form and an information sheet in order to give enough in-
formation to the user before they could make up their mind regarding
participating in the research. In the application form, the purpose of the
study, the waywe questioned the interviewee and the data that wewere to
gather were explained. We have attached Human ethics application form
in Appendix C.
Consent forms and information sheets were required to make the rea-
son for an interview transparent for the participants. In the information
sheet submitted to the Human Ethics Committee, we wrote a description
of the project, the nature of the data collection, and the intended use of this
data. In the consent formwe explained that this data would be used by the
experimenter only for the purpose of this study and it would not be used
for any other purposes. It was also mentioned that the participants’ iden-
tities were confidential and that their role and their organization would
not be revealed. We also mentioned that they could withdraw from the
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study up to two weeks after finishing data collection. The consent form
and information sheet for managers are illustrated in Appendix D and E.
6.1.5 Participants
The focal participants in this study were the people in charge of imple-
menting content and service blocking in those specific organizations in
which we ran our test.
6.1.6 Recruitment
In the first part of our data collection, we ran our own Web Censorship
Monitoring Tool (WCMT) on-sites. The sites were selected by compiling
a list of free and paid WiFi providers by consulting sources such as the
Yellow Pages and directories of WiFi providers in Wellington. We ran the
project by ourselves. The main benefits of running the experiment by our-
selves were that we did not expose any third parties to risks associated
with accessing potentially blocked content and we could monitor the run-
ning of the tests directly to determine if there were any security or other
risks that could occur during the testing.
In the second part, we contacted the people in charge of management
of the service. This had been done in person at the businesses by providing
a letter containing an information sheet, and, if there was no customer rep-
resentative, we used resources such as the email contact detail provided by
theWiFi provider and/or used resources such as the Companies Directory
to source contacts details for the owners of the companies providing the
service. A draft of the email is provided in Appendix F.
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6.1.7 Interview questions
In the interviews, we asked the people in charge about their ideas regard-
ing blocking and censorship, whether they were the pros or cons of block-
ing, to what extend they implemented censorship, from which category
they had chosen the URLs and services for blocking, if they made the
blocked list by themselves or they just purchased it, how often they up-
dated their lists and so on. The participants in our study reflected their
views of their organizations. In Appendix G, the list of interview ques-
tions is presented.
6.1.8 Hazards or inconvenience for the participants
There were three main risks/issues to consider:
1. We carried out the testing first and informed the organizations after-
wards. The rationale was that we:
(a) simply carried out activities that an ordinary user might carry out;
and, (b) if organizations were aware of our experiments ahead of time we
might not be able to recruit participants and we were also interested in the
difference between the perceptions of organizations with respect to their
beliefs about what their restrictions and the realities were.
2. The URLs used to test for blocking had been sourced from search en-
gines where the URLs were generated for different categories news, bank-
ing, adult sites, hackings sites, and entertainment, etc. We sourced these
by using search terms associated with these categories and using URLs
returned by the search engine (with safe filtering disabled). These URLs
were auto generated and there was a possibility that the URLs may con-
tain links currently blocked or monitored by the Department of Internal
Affairs (DIA). It was impossible to check this ahead of time because they
did not allow individuals or organizations to check which URLs may or
may not be monitored at a national level.
3. After running the quantitative experiment, I provided managers
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with the information sheets and ask for their participation.
6.1.9 Data collection method
The data collection was performed in one phase. After sending emails to
ask them for participation, we met the IT professionals in their office. We
prepared a list of questions to ask managers. They were all asked the same
questions. We had been collecting two types of data: observing and inter-
viewing. The interview data was a recorded audio for 30 to 50 minutes in
one meeting. We had been wearing a microphone in the meeting in order
to record the interviews.
There were different places in New Zealand which offered wireless In-
ternet access (WiFi) either free or paid to their customers. They claimed
that they were offering free Internet. By using our implemented tool that
we ran at their site, these networks were investigated and the list of block
URLs and services were prepared for all of these locations in order tomake
it transparent for users.
After observation, managers of those organizations which offered free
Internet were asked to be interviewed for the reasons behind content and
service blocking. That is why we had to obtain their consent in order to
record their voice.
6.1.10 Data analysis
The interviews were transcribed and reviewed. Reviewing was an itera-
tive process, which made visible themes from the data that related to the
censorship polices. The inferences and conclusions were about the reasons
for implementing censorship.
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6.1.11 Implications of the proposed research
This study will have an impact on the transparency for the users. Because
the people who implemented censorship did not like to make it clear for
the users, the users could not understand the reason for not having access
to certain content and services. This research sheds light on the activity of
the censors.
6.2 Data collection
In this section, detailed information regarding our interviews with the IT
professionals for implementing censorship and the reasons for that have
been presented.
Unfortunately, three out of eight organizations replied to our request
for participating in the interviews. And two out of three individuals in
those organizations agreed to participate in our interviews. One possible
reason for the low response is a lack of interest in the topic, though it is
also possible that people did not have time to be interviewed.
The interviews were conducted between September 2013 and October
2013. Table 6.1 shows different organizations missions, region activity, and
whether they had censorship or not.
The order of interview was based on the order they responded to our
request emails. In order to get the signature from our participants, we took
an information sheet and a consent form to all the places we went for the
interview.
We also asked them to write their email address if they liked to have a
copy of the results. Both Organization 1 and Organization 3 asked to have
a copy of the blocked results from all the organizations.
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People Roles
Organization 1 Architecture
and Security
Manager
Organization 2 IT support
Organization 3 Manager Infor-
mation Technol-
ogy Services
Table 6.2
IT professionals’ role in the organizations
The people we interviewed and their roles are presented in Table 6.2.
6.3 Managers’ perspectives on blocking
After sending requests for an interview to all the IT professionals from
our experimental networks, we interviewed those people who replied to
us. A description of the interviews that had been conducted is followed
below. We used pseudonyms to protect the identity of interviewees and
their organizations.
6.3.1 Organization 1
Our first interviewwas with Jack who is an architecture and security man-
ager.
Jack mentioned that Organization 1 used Blue Coat [43] for implement-
ing blocking system. Blue Coat Devices are capable of doing filtering,
censorship, and surveillance. These devices are used around the world.
All the responsibility regarding blocking is with Blue Coat team. He also
pointed out that Organization 1 purchased the list and they did not pre-
pare the list of blocking. Then they decided which URL should or should
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not be blocked.
In response to why the categorization was wrong. He said that if the
website needed to be blocked, they would not care about the wrong cate-
gorization.
We asked about the benign websites which had been blocked. He
maintained that this was all about Blue Coat as they did not prepare the
list. He also stated that if websites were hacked they could be considered
as malicious. In those cases, the websites would be blocked.
We asked why they did not treat equally all the URLs from the same
category. He mentioned the decision had been made by Blue Coat.
Organization 1 just provided the service for the users but someone else
was responsible for blocking. At least at Organization 1, he mentioned
that if someone had a problem with any sort of blocking, he/ she could
request for unblocking and the decision would not take more than one
week to make in the worst case scenario.
According to Jack, they had decreased the level of blocking since three
weeks ago. Organization 1 used to be more restricted but they reduced the
number of blockings. This was a positive point at Organization1. When
we asked him why they implement filtering, he said that the organiza-
tion did not have any sort of filtering six or seven years ago but they had
received complaints from parents that they did not like their children to
have access to objectionable materials. It was one of the reasons to start
implementing censorship. The other reason was to protect their network
from bad usage. He also stated that it was also something related to the
history of Organization 1 and its policy and the loyalty of Organization 1
to special communities they were registered with. These were the reasons
that pushed them to start implementing blocking. In this regard he said,
”they very rarely received calls for unblockingmeaning that they achieved
a balance in their blockings”.
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6.3.2 Organization 2
When we sent an email to Joe, the IT professional in Organization 2, to ask
for an interview, we received an email from him stating that he could not
comment on what sites were blocked through WiFi as he did not manage
that and it was provided externally. He iterated that we would be best to
talk to business internet providers such as Gen-I.”
It was interesting that these places offered services to customers but
they were not responsible for that. We were under the impression that if
people provided services for users, they had to be responsible for that. But
what we saw regarding censorship was different. We observed that third
parties made decision for all these places and that the organizations just
followed their decisions.
It is also interesting that they all had filtering but they were different
in terms of the number of filtering and the category they blocked which
showed that they did not have similar ideas regarding censorship.
6.3.3 Organization 3
We spoke With Alex who was the manager of Information Technology
Services at Organization 3.
He pointed out that 18 months ago, Organization 3 started to imple-
ment blocking with Telstraclear. They wanted to have a little censorship
and they wanted to have blocking for pornography websites. Organiza-
tion 3 knew that Telstraclear had joined the project of blocking from DIA
but since they wanted to apply more blocking, they purchased another
blocking system called DansGuardian [13]. This system was good for ed-
ucational systems and since Organization 3 was a family facility, Dans-
Guardian software was a good choice for them. Alex mentioned that be-
cause the organization was a strong brand and had its own good reputa-
tion, it was not appropriate for them to provide these sorts of materials
online for their users.
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He said they were happy with their light level of censorship and they
received a balance in their level of censorship. The only complaint they
received was from a German couple when they got a blocked page for the
political websites.
He also mentioned that they did not want to be active in censorship
but at the same time they wanted to remain as a family environment.
When we asked him why they did blocking for certain topics such as
alcohol, joke, gambling, and drugs, he mentioned he did not know that
alcohol, drug, gambling, or joke websites had been blocked in his organi-
zation.
We also asked him why they did not behave the same for the same
category of URLs. He mentioned it was all about DansGuardian. He also
stated that as it was clear, DansGuardian was not a proper software for
them to use since through using DansGuardian they had blockedweb sites
that they did not want to block. He said the organization had not tested
their systems yet and it was great that we tested their blocking system and
informed them about the results of blockings there.
He mentioned that they did not want to block gambling, alcohol, and
drug. They just wanted to block pornography. He also stated that maybe
these websites had links to high ranked censorship websites, and that was
why they had been blocked by the software they used.
We asked him about peer to peer applications. He said that they did not
allow users to use file sharing because he believed that the organization
was not a proper place for file sharing activity.
We asked them whether they had different level of censorship at a dif-
ferent time. He said that he did not think so. He said it was possible that
Telstraclear or the DansGuardian software got updates at that time and
they had got different blockings at different times. He also pointed out
that they wanted to keep mostly open rather than mostly closed.
We asked him why they did not use a same pattern for all their block-
ings, he mentioned that since Telstraclear had its own blocking system and
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DansGuardian had its own, there was not a consistent pattern for block-
ing. We mentioned that it was not an ordinary Telstraclear service as we
had the same service at home but the number of blockings was different.
Then he said that Telstraclear might have added more blocking for us. It
was interesting that they had very little information about how their sys-
tem worked. They also did not know which categories of websites had
been blocked.
We asked him why they did not prepare the list of blockings and the
reasons for that. He said it was not feasible for them considering time and
cost.
We asked him that people had access to 3G, so even if he blocked spe-
cial contents, they could access those objectionable materials. He replied
that for cellphone parents were responsible and Organization 3 was re-
sponsible for their free WiFi but not for cellphones. He also stated that
they did not want people to have access to objectionable material through
their network. He said the organization had its good reputation and they
did want to remain as a family environment. He emphasized that most of
the people would be horrified if they said they would provide all the ma-
terial without any blocking. He also mentioned that a majority of people
wanted blocking.
In the end, he said cost, the type of people they had, and education
were important factors in providing the service. He believed that because
they provided a free service, people could not ask for more. People who
needed more freedom on the Internet could pay for it and have more free-
dom.
He said to us that if we could conclude our study with the best solution
or a reasonable approach that they could apply, that would be great as
there were lots of pros and cons regarding blocking.
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6.4 Findings
Our data showed that there was a variety of perspectives regarding In-
ternet censorship. Different free Internet Service Providers had different
ideas regarding implementing censorship. But it was clear that they all
had blocking and they were just different in terms of the number and the
categories of blockings.
For example, Organization 1 and Organization 3 blocked file sharing
protocols to reduce Internet traffic. Organization 1 believed that it was
illegal to use file sharing application and Organization 3 said that it was
not a proper place for file sharing activates. At the same time, they could
not use the same reasons for blocking alcohol or joke websites. But they
both mentioned because there were third parties who would make the
blocked list, it was out of their control. It is interesting how unthoughtfully
they purchased the list and offered the service based on that list.
In Internet censorship, motivation was the most important element we
faced. Before this study we assumed that censors were motivated to block
content and they just had a vague instruction to alter anything they be-
lieved was inappropriate even if it was against the law. When we inter-
viewed the IT managers, for example, Organization 1 emphasized that
half of the reasons for implementing blocking was to provide security and
half for policy and history of Organization 1. Organization 1, as Jack said,
had a loyalty to special committees they were registered with, and that
was why they had to implement blockings.
As in Organization 3 themotivation for implementing censorship came
from the idea that they did not want to damage to the reputation of Or-
ganization 3 and its famous brand. They wanted to keep the family en-
vironment of Organization 3 by implementing blocking for pornography
websites. They also pointed out that Organization 3was not a proper place
for doing file sharing and they did not let people use that because it was
against the law. Moreover, these applications used their bandwidth. But
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he did not know that they had blocked URLs from alcohol, drug, gam-
bling, and jokes categories. He said that as it was free service, it was cus-
tomers’ decision to use free service with limitation or paid services with-
out any limitations.
Both these two organizations believed that censorship was essential for
their security. They also emphasized that it would keep the society and
organization safe, and that was good for protecting individuals as well as
preventing abuse.
They mentioned when they blocked peer-to-peer content, they wanted
to prevent the network resources from abuse, and that when they blocked
the pornography, gambling, and content related to drugs and alcohol, they
wanted to keep the society safe.
One interviewee stated that those organizations such as Organization 1
which had branches in different countries had different censorship criteria
to match that country’s culture, and these branches were controlled by
external places. But unfortunately we did not manage to convince any of
these organizations to take part in our research.
6.5 Summary
In this chapter, we presented our methodology for qualitative research.
We defined how we conducted our research and collected the data, whom
we wanted to interview, how we recruited people for an interview, and
what we asked interviewees.
The purpose of conducting this phase of our data collection was to
make transparency for the users by informing users regarding reasons for
implementing blocking. In this chapter, we also presented our qualita-
tive interviews. We presented the opinions of IT professionals from those
organizations in which we ran our experiment. It was clear that differ-
ent organizations had different implementations, software, and blocked
lists in order to implement their blockings. We also saw that motivation
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was different. Motivation could be for security issues, keeping the soci-
ety and organization safe, network efficiency, or preventing abuse of their
networks. But it was clarified that all had a level of filtering.
In the next chapter we discuss the issues we have identified regarding
blocking and the problems it has raised. Based on the issues we identify,
we offer our solutions.
Chapter 7
Discussion
In this chapter, we review what we presented in the previous chapters.
Thenwe propose that because censorship is a fast growing area, researchers
should investigate it more profoundly.
We believe that there are issues with implementing censorship, espe-
cially with how the system is working now. Some of these issues include:
blindly purchasing a blocked list by authorities and implementing censor-
ship based on that, filtering many benign contents as objectionable mate-
rials, not treating many similar websites in the same way, not being trans-
parent to the users at the time of blocking, and not being responsible for
wrongly implementing censorship.
Our findings show that the system of implementing censorship which
is widely used had many problems. Thus, it is our duty to address this
problem and ask for support in this area. If we do not address this practice
and fight against it, blocking will be implemented more and more and
consequently will affect more people accessing their desired material.
Inwhat follows, we summarize our discussion into three sections, namely
what is happening around the world, what is happening in New Zealand,
and what we can do about it.
117
118 CHAPTER 7. DISCUSSION
7.1 What is happening around the world?
Web censorship is a phenomenon across the globe. Governments monitor
and censor the Internet. The policy for implementing censorship is similar
to a black box for the users. Users do not know about the traffic which has
beenmonitored and classified as censored. Everydaymore andmore users
find the Internet has been under surveillance, controlled, and fragmented.
Users believe that Internet accessmeans accessingwhatever Internet offers
and not having access to the approved application and content.
Saltzer who is one of the key players in the development of the Inter-
net in 1981 mentioned about principles of the End-to-End: ”Application-
specific functions ought to reside in the end hosts of a network” [75]. This
principle is not being considered nowadays when the data is captured
through control of either side of the connection. These activities make
the open Internet under threat. By implementing censorship, also known
as filtering, users are prevented from accessing the desired content consid-
ered unsuitable for them by governments.
Motivation of governments to implement censorship and take control
of the Internet has increased due to huge use of the Internet. Govern-
ments easily shape the Internet based on the norms and culture of the
society. Therefore, censorship has become political, social, religious, and
child pornographic lookalikes in different countries.
Different countries have different scenarios and degrees of censorship
for their citizens. For example, China has the strongest censorship in the
world by blocking social websites such as Facebook, Twitter, Tumblr, and
political websites related to political leadership, etc. Some countries, such
as Saudi Arabia, consider religious morals in implementing censorship.
Iran, as another example, talks about fragmenting the Internet and is going
to have ”Iranian Internet”. It allows the flow of information within the
country but not beyond the country.
Filtering the Internet has profit for authorities. Considering the econ-
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omy, making limitation on Internet is more profitable. Considering social
and political aspects, authorities are capable of taking control of the so-
ciety and preventing it from harmful activities which are against the law
and not suitable for the government. To put everything in a nutshell when
governments close the Internet, it is much easier to control it.
While some people believe that censorship is not self-regulated and
the governments are responsible for implementing the censorship, there
are others who believe that censorship is not a great idea and it affects the
users’ needs and trust.
People who oppose censorship believe that there are different issues
with the practice of blocking. For example, people will not be able to
access their desired material which has an effect on trust in society, its
knowledge, and democracy.
Censorship regarding films, books, and games is clear and transpar-
ent for the users but not for the websites and services. This lack of trans-
parency will leave people confused as to whether the website is blocked or
offline. The other impact of lack of transparency in implementing censor-
ship is that benign content is sometimes blocked and classified as offensive
content by authorities. If censorship is transparent the benign websites
which are considered offensive will be clarified and the beneficial content
will not be restricted for people. Moreover, secretly implementing the cen-
sorship would make citizens lose trust in governments.
The idea of filtering comforts parents and authorities that their chil-
dren or staff are prevented from accessing the unwanted content. This
may give a false sense of security to parents which is not appealing. The
government, Internet Service Providers, and families are responsible to
teach parents how to prevent their children from accessing inappropriate
content. It is also beneficial if parents can teach their children to be re-
sponsible for their safety instead of waiting for their parents to provide
safety for them. Most of the people in general and children in particular
access the Internet through their phones which increases the concern of
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their families.
Censorship or filtering is an offense to democracy. It is similar to the
government holding the users’ hands to prevent them from doing things
which, it thinks, can offend them. The problem is that government thinks
that by censoring websites they could prevent users from accessing the
inappropriate content. This is true for just a portion of the society, as there
are many ways for the motivated people to bypass censorship.
7.2 What is happening in New Zealand?
New Zealand is a digital country since Internet is used in 4 out of 5 New
Zealand homes [22]. In terms of Internet access, New Zealand is one of the
countries with the highest Internet access rate. There are different reasons
which have led the number of Internet users to increase such as a decrease
in the price of broadband, mobile access, ADSL, and motivation for ap-
plying for jobs online, etc. More than 93% of the Internet in New Zealand
is provided by ISPs such as TelestraClear, Telecom, and Vodafone. These
Internet Service Providers have implemented filtering in conjunction with
DIA.
DIA states that the URLs which are mostly related to child abuse ma-
terials are restricted and no one knows exactly what they have blocked.
Once the government starts blocking, they can start to filter websites which
are not convenient for them. All requests will be routed to the government
servers. The user’s request will be compared to the blocked list. If it is
matched with their black list, the request will be denied. This blocked list
is revised by staff each month to have an updated blocked list every time
[15].
In [15], it is published that Child Exploitation Filtering System costs
$150000 which is given freely to the ISPs to block around 7000 objection-
able sites. It is also published that the number of blocked websites is 5
times more than the ones in the UK list and twice as much as those in
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Australia. It is in contrast to what is heard from the public and published
by ONI that censorship in Australia is more than it is in New Zealand.
Techliberty [63] announced, The Government has noMandate to Filter
the Internet. They mentioned that censorship was not covered by law and
still no laws were passed in the Parliament. They believe that implement-
ing censorship to mass websites is against the Bill of Rights.
Even if censorship is legitimate, implementing it secretly does not give
good sense to people. As a response to this, DIA claims that publishing
list of web sites is a pointer to the crime and DIA uses its power not to
publish it. Starting to implement censorship gives power to governments
to implement more censorship whenever and whatever they like.
A survey commissioned by InternetNZ [52] about public thoughts about
the government’s Internet filter has shown interesting results about this
study. Only 9% of the people knew whether or not their ISP used gov-
ernment filter. The ISPs which provide more than 90% of the NZ Internet
market use government’s censorship program. Only 23% of the people
wanted the government to filter their Internet connection.
It is also worth mentioning that authorities know that even implement-
ing censorship is not effective and motivated people will access the de-
sired content. Given that, what is the reason for breaching the privacy and
freedom of the citizens? Prior to this action, the citizens cannot trust the
government.
DIA has clarified that censorship has been applied to child pornogra-
phy sites. The question remains why they do not consider other ways
such as requesting the servers hosting these sorts of websites to delete
them. Child pornography is illegal in almost all countries. Thus, it is a
better idea to fight against this issue globally by removing it from Internet
and not implementing censorship on what brings dishonesty for govern-
ments. Even if the government believes that child pornography is blocked,
it is still there. There are lots of websites with the same content.
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7.2.1 Specifying the problem
There are problems with the level of filtering such as:
1. In New Zealand censorship is applied secretly and is not transparent
for people. One of the effects of implementing censorship secretly is
that some of the websites are incorrectly blocked. For example, Ger-
man couples could not access a political site in Germany through Te
Papa Museum free WiFi because it was categorized as Japan’s porn
websites [54].
2. It is mentioned that only child abuse web sites are blocked which is
not true and there are more websites and services which are blocked.
Based on the work we have done, depending on the organizations,
there are other categories of websites and services which are blocked
as well.
3. If filtering is applied for children in order to keep them safe on the
Internet, it is hard for adults to bypass it. At the same time those who
were the target of censorship could bypass it.
4. If organizations are against child pornography, they should fight
against this issue globally not breaching privacy of people.
5. Censorship or filtering operates as an offense to democracy. It is
similar to the government holding the users’ hands to prevent them
from doing things which, it thinks, can offend them. The problem
is that government thinks by censoring websites, they could prevent
users from accessing the inappropriate content. This is true for just
a portion of the society, as there are many ways for the motivated
people to bypass censorship.
6. Authorities who implement censorship are not responsive. Even
the authorities mention that users should inform in case things are
wrongly blocked, they are not easy to convince.
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7.2.2 Problems arising by implementing censorship
There are different problems which arise in society by implementing cen-
sorship. Firstly, implementing censorship affects the economy of the busi-
nesses because customers cannot get the direction or information from the
website. Secondly, implementing censorship will give good sense of safety
to parents that their children are safe on the Internet but actually the con-
tent is still there. Thirdly, filtering will affect the knowledge of society. For
example, filtering sexual material will prevent young people from access-
ing the healthy information, making young people blind in terms of their
future safety. The other effect is the performance of the Internet. Since all
the traffic needs to go through DIA, it may cause a performance issue and
will make a single point of failure. Fifthly, distrust will come to the soci-
ety, and citizens of the country will not trust the government as they know
they are censoring more than child pornography websites.
7.3 So, what should be done?
We were motivated to conduct this study to find out about the scale of the
problem to find the blocked websites and services in order to make trans-
parency for people. It is clear that blocking has been applied to websites
other than child abuse, but finding all the blocked content has not been
easy. Although the list of blocked websites is not published by DIA, the
users of the Internet know about the probability of censoring some web-
sites. Child abuse websites are blocked by government but different sites
and services are blocked at different times by ISPs and organizations. All
the filtering affects principles of human rights organizations. But because
Internet filtering is so widespread and supported by strong opposition, it
is so hard to debate.
Finding a unique and reliable way of finding censorship was not easy.
We had limitation in terms of using different ports as most of the desired
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ports for us were blocked in different organizations. Therefore, we had
to make lots of changes in our implemented tool for each organization.
Also due to the importance of censorship subject, we had to use manual
analyses as well as automatic ones.
Our experience in places such as Organization 3, Organization 4, Orga-
nization 1, Organization 5, Organization 7, Organization 8, organization 2,
and organization 6 showed how these places treated their WiFi users dif-
ferently and how they restricted the use of Internet to specific traffic and
websites through specific ports.
We tried to access a variety of URLs from different categorizations us-
ing our implemented tool to find out about the prevalence of censorship in
different organizations. It was thought that there might not be much con-
tent blocking in organizations in New Zealand but there were of course
ports and services which were blocked. Our results showed that not only
lots of ports and services had been blocked but also therewere lots of URLs
from each category which had been blocked.
For example, in a short distance from organization 5, organization 1
offers free Internet to their customers but with more restrictions in ac-
cessing the websites and using ports. Organization 1 restricts access to
most services by blocking ports such as FTP, SSH, SMTP, DNS, POP3, RPC,
NetBIOS, IMAP, SNMP, SMB, MTP/SSL. In organization 1 we also tested
the free WiFi with our first round of URLs. Out of 180 URLs, 114 URLs
were censored. These include categories from proxy, gambling, malicious
sources, adults, file sharing, anonymizer websites, racism, drug, religions,
and games. If they were eager not to allow access to objectionable mate-
rial, it was possible for users to access it through their mobile phones or
other free WiFis close to them.
In contrast, organization 5 provides open access to all the services. Al-
most all the tested URLs were also open access except four URLs.
In organization 4 most of the ports we tested were open to use except
for DNS (port 53), RPC (port 135), NetBIOS (port 139), and SNMP (port
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161). These ports were expected to be blocked as they were not used gen-
erally in local networks. But it was interesting how organization 4 used
different ways of implementing censorship for different contents. For ex-
ample, for some of the websites from jokes and adult entertainment cat-
egory they were clear by providing transparent blocked messages. For
some of the websites from Peer-to-Peer (P2P) or adult entertainments cat-
egory, they sent an error message. The problem was that a consistent pat-
tern had not been used for all blockings. organization 4 was one of the
organizations with high number of content blocking.
At organization 3 access to ports SMB (port 445), SMTP (port 25), DNS
(port 53), RPC (port 135), and NetBIOS (port 139) were blocked. We ex-
pected to have these port blockings because of security purposes. But it is
interesting how organization 3 did over-blocking by implementing benign
websites as offensive ones and how they categorized these blocked web-
sites wrongly. For example, organization 3 blocked access to some online
shops selling children’s toys and they categorized it under ”Pornography;
Extreme”. Our experiment in organization 3 identified that the URLs had
been blocked from different categories such as proxy, gambling, malicious
sources, adults, file sharing, anonymizer, racism, and drug.
In organization 6, all the services we test were open except TCP access
to remote SMTP server’s port 25 which was prohibited. With this blocking
it was not possible to send email via SMTP. This sort of blocking was very
common because this port could be used by hackers for generating spam.
In terms of content blocking, organization 6 blocked some of the content
from adult entertainment by redirecting them to administrator’s desired
content.
Organization 2 provided access to all services. They had a couple of
blockings which were not transparent for users. In their strategy, they
redirected the request for objectionable content from adult entertainment
to administrator’s desired content.
The organization 8 provided access to all services. In terms of content
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blocking they redirected the request to desired content of authorities. In
some cases a transparent error message was shown to the users.
Organization 7 was extreme in terms of service blocking. Ports 25, 53,
80, 110, 143, 443, and 993 were open and all others were closed. In terms
of content blocking they blocked content from pornography and P2P web-
sites.
Our interviewwith Organization 1 and Organization 3 showed that for
example Organization 1 applied blocking due to two important reasons:
security and network efficiency. Organization 1 also mentioned that this
was all about the policy and history of the organization and its loyalty to
the organizations it was registered with.
Organization 3 mentioned that their organization was a great brand
and they wanted to keep the great brand of their organization and its fam-
ily environment. But they had less information regarding their blocking
system. For example, they did know that they had blocking from alcohol,
drug, and gambling websites.
We also obtained interesting feedback fromOrganization 2. The IT pro-
fessional from this organization pointed out that they were not responsi-
ble for their free WiFi. It is interesting that they offered free WiFi but they
were not responsible for that. It shows how blindly they implemented the
system based on what they purchased.
The variety of the results of what was blocked showed that ISPs and
blocking software did not have a set of agreed approaches for implement-
ing blockings. More open discussion about what it is appropriate to block
and what should be available is needed.
We would like to argue that implementing censorship at a national
level is not a good idea and implementing censorship by individuals is
a better decision. There is another solution to identify adults from young
children. Then we can ask adults whether or not they want censorship
and give them all the information about censorship, how they implement
it andwhat the categorization is. We also need to teach them how to report
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if the censorship is incorrectly applied.
It is also possible that parents who need to implement the blocking for
their children get information through their ISPs when they subscribe for
the services. This solution will be helpful for children who need safety on
the Internet.
It has to be mentioned to the authorities and parents who like to pre-
vent users and children from watching these objectionable materials in
their sites that at the same time there are different sources of getting Inter-
net for people. Therefore, if one of these free WiFi’s blocks some websites,
the users still have access to 3G. So free Internet Service Providers cannot
worry about downloading banned materials. And, it is not their respon-
sibility to control their Internet usage. Therefore, blocking content could
not be effective when people access different sources to get information. It
is, then, better to implement blocking on individual computers and cell-
phone devices through parents.
Educating people is very important. Government could educate par-
ents how to keep their children safe on the Internet. At the same time
government and parents can teach children how to keep themselves safe
and not wait for their parents and government to keep them safe in the
Internet.
Thus, we believe we could consider other solutions as suggested be-
low:
1. We should not apply blocking at national level, and let individuals
implement blocking.
2. We should educate children about how to be safe on the Internet.
3. We should fight against the issue of child pornography globally.
4. We should be transparent for the users by providing the list of block-
ings in terms of content and services.
5. We should be helpful with providing reasons for blockings.
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6. We should bemore cautious in choosing the software for implement-
ing blocking.
7. We should not rely on the available blocked lists and being more
cautious on categorizing blocked content.
7.4 Summary
This chapter discussed the prevalence of Internet blocking around theworld
and particularly in New Zealand. We presented the problems of imple-
menting central censorship and the issues raised by these problems. We
emphasized that nobody knew what was happening on the Internet and
what would happen to the Internet in future. There was a need for a sys-
tem to collect, analyze, provide visibility to manage the Internet better. We
mentioned that censoring free movies and music prevented illegal down-
loading of files which were against the copyright agreement. Censoring
child pornography kept children safe. But when it came to censoring
adults’ jokes, and political websites, it was annoying for people. We also
discussed that there was a regulation in adults and circumvention tools.
It was not ethical to restrict adult, entertainment and social networks for
people.
Chapter 8
Conclusions
This thesis has addressed the prevalence of content and service blockings
in different organizations in Wellington, New Zealand. Due to huge use
of the Internet, governments and organizations have been motivated to
implement censorship and take control of the Internet. This blocking,
whether for security or for network efficiency, has significant effects on
people’s access to services and information. Also, this sort of restriction
will affect the society in terms of economy, communication, knowledge,
expressing ideas, etc. These issues are often not considered when authori-
ties implement blocking.
There are lots of studies conducted around the world to prove Internet
blocking at a governmental level. But there was no such study conducted
in New Zealand. This study bridges the gap by focusing on censorship
at an organizational level. The responses to what is being blocked in New
Zealand, who implements blocking in NewZealand, andwhat the reasons
for these blockings are, motivated us to conduct our study. And, we did
our study inWellingtonNewZealand in places we had access to theirWiFi
or where they provided free WiFi for their customers in order to make
transparency for the users.
For this reason, in Chapter 2 of our thesis, we gave a discussion on
Internet filtering around the world and particularly in New Zealand and
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provided a discussion on background and related work. We also reviewed
tools for investigating Internet filtering. We reviewed different monitoring
tools since we did not want to implement a new tool. Unfortunately, we
could not use available tools for conducting our study since they just fo-
cused on a special traffic such as HTTP or they did not consider the limita-
tion of our context in terms of service blocking. Comparing available web
censorshipmonitoring tools led us to choose OONI. Our preliminarywork
showed that OONI did not work in our context due to different issues.
Firstly, OONI used Tor and Tor was blocked in almost all organizations we
focused on. Secondly, using this tool gave us lots of false positives since
OONI compared just the length of content fetched from experimental with
Tor control network. It was possible that there were lots of contents whose
lengths were similar but their contents were different. Thirdly, OONI did
not consider service blocking. Due to these issues with OONI we set the
requirements for our own tool.
In Chapter 3 we presented the design and implementation of our new
tool (WCMT) based on the issues we identified with OONI. We imple-
mented our own web server which acted as a proxy and request the page
on behalf of the client from VUW open network and Tor network. This
enabled us to compare the contents at the same time. We compared the
results retrieved from our control and experimental networks in terms of
header length, body length, header and body content and images to de-
crease the number of false positives. Our tool became capable of find-
ing service blocking because we assumed we would not have much con-
tent blocking but we would have service blocking. However, the results
showed that we had both content and service blockings.
In Chapter 4 we performed a preliminary test on our tool in order to
see how our new tool could satisfy our requirements. Our performance
evaluation showed that WCMT successfully covered the bandwidth limi-
tation of our context. The tool was fast enough to run 2400 URLs.
In Chapter 5, we set our methodology for running quantitative re-
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search. We ran our first phase of experiment using our implemented tool
(WCMT). We prepared a profile for each of the organizations by identify-
ing the list of blockings in terms of contents and services. It was shown
that different levels of blocking existed for organizations. For example,
organization 1 by 18.88% was extreme in terms of content blocking fol-
lowed by organization 3 with 9.12% and organization 4 with 5.58% block-
ing. These values were not absolute ones as these websites were sampled
and the test was conducted at a specific time and it could change now and
then.
In terms of service blocking, different organizations blocked different
number of services. Organization 7 with 15 port blockings was extreme
followed by organization 1 with 12 blockings and organization 3 and or-
ganization 4 with 5 port blocking. organization 2, organization 8, and
organization 5 did not block any services for their customers. Our eval-
uation of content and service blocking at organizational level showed that
our methodology was successful in finding content and service blocking.
In Chapter 6, we set our methodology for our qualitative research to in-
terview authorities about implementing censorship. We wanted to make
the reason for blocking transparent for the users. Since our study involved
people, we had to apply for Human Ethics approval. We filled the Human
Ethics application form and prepared an information sheet and consent
form for the focal participants. After getting approval from the Commit-
tee, we started the second phase of our data collection.
We started our study by requesting for an interview from IT managers
of organizations in which we ran our tool through their network. We liked
to have a more informed policy debate about the need to block access to
Internet websites and services, and its impact on people’s ability to access
information which they needed. Three out of eight organizations replied
to our emails requesting for an interview. Two out of those three accepted
to take part in an interview. Our data showed that there were different
reasons for implementing blocking such as performing security, protecting
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individuals, and network efficiency.
Organization 1 mentioned that they applied blocking due to two im-
portant reasons: security and network efficiency. He also mentioned that
the reason for implementing blocking came from the policy and history of
the organization and its loyalty to the organizations they were registered
with.
The IT professional in Organization 3 mentioned that this organization
was a great brand and they wanted to keep their great brand and its family
environment. But they did not have enough information regarding their
blocking system. For example, they did not know that they had blocking
from categories such as alcohol, drug, and gambling websites.
But unfortunately, Organization 2 mentioned they were not responsi-
ble for their free WiFi. It was interesting that they offered free WiFi but
they were not responsible for that. It showed how blindly they imple-
mented the system they purchased.
In Chapter 7, we presented a discussion based on the issues we had
identified in our study. Our study concluded that central blocking, itself
was not a good idea for preventing access to the content because there
were always different ways to bypass the blocking for a motivated per-
son. We believe that there are issues with implementing central blocking,
especially with how the system is working now.
Our quantitative study showed that there were blockings in all the or-
ganizations. and the blockings were different just in terms of category
and their number. It was interesting how different organizations looked
at their customers differently, how they were not transparent to their cus-
tomers with not using the same pattern in all blockings, and how their
polices changed over time. We have to emphasize that the variety of the
results of what was blocked showed that ISPs and blocking software did
not have a set of agreed approaches for implementing blockings. More
open discussion about what it is appropriate to block and what should be
available is needed.
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Our qualitative study showed that either the topic of investigating block-
ing was not an interesting topic for the authorities or that they were very
busy since we received a few replies to our email regarding request for the
interview. The results showed that they blindly purchased their blocking
list from third parties and they did not have enough information regarding
their blocking system.
In the following section, I will discuss specific contributions of this
study.
8.1 Contributions
Our study represented first content and service blocking measurements in
New Zealand. We hoped that our findings could give enough information
regarding censorship and network neutrality debates. The goal of this
study was to raise people’s awareness and ask them to contribute to this
area. Specific contributions of my thesis are described below:
1. Designing and building a new tool for detecting content and service
blocking that does not rely upon access to an oracle network (Tor) at
the testing sites. This new tool was called WCMT.
2. Designing and conducting an empirical study to quantify what was
and was not blocked at a representative sample of organizations pro-
viding free wireless access to the Internet.
3. Designing and conducting a qualitative study to follow up with the
organizations investigated quantitatively in order to look into the
motivation for and understanding of blocking polices adopted by
organizations.
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8.2 Further study
This thesis presented the design, development, and analysis of WCMT,
but there were areas that needed improvement. Here, I offer further sug-
gestions:
Firstly, in this thesis we concentrated on content and service blocking
while there are other ways for ISPs to do traffic manipulations. It would
be useful to find out about different ways ISPs used to manipulate traffic.
Secondly, we checked special ports or services, while there are other
services and ports which may be blocked. It is beneficial to identify them.
Thirdly, we have run our experiment in 8 Internet service providers
while there are other places which have equal or more censorship. It is
useful if we could prepare a list of blockings in other places as well.
Last but not least, during the qualitative part of our study, we under-
stood that there was variation in terms of number and category of block-
ings in different places. When we asked IT professionals for interview,
we also noticed variation in their responses or lack of interest in doing so.
Hence, in a future work, we recommend further investigation into the un-
derlying reasons why IT professionals are apparently reluctant in dealing
with censorship in their relevant organizations in New Zealand.
Appendices
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Appendix A
Content blockings’ results
In this appendix, the results of content blocking tests in different organi-
zations are given.
A.1 Content blocking in organization 1
The results of content blocking tests in organization 1 are given in Table
A.1.
Table A.1
Organization 1 test results
Category Blocked Sites
Continued on next page
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Table A.1 (continued)
Category Blocked Sites
Adult/Mature
Content; Illegal
Drugs
http://www.pass-any-drug-test.com/, http://www.the-
hive.ws/, http://www.weedtalk.com/,
http://www.hightimes.com/, http://www.the-head-shop.co.uk/,
http://www.cannabis.com/, http://www.marijuana.com/,
http://amphetamines.com/, http://heroin.org/,
http://www.neonjoint.com/, http://www.erowid.org/,
http://www.mpp.org/, http://www.overgrow.com/,
http://www.yahooka.com/, http://www.project420.com/,
http://www.thegooddrugsguide.com/, http://www.shroomery.org/,
http://bong.com/, http://www.420.com/,
http://www.everyonedoesit.com/, http://www.marijuanareform.org/,
http://www.420auction.com/, http://pass-any-drug-test.com/,
http://hightimes.com.
Malicious
Sources
http://warco.pl/, http://kremlinhotel.ru/js/jshttp/pha/seiko.php,
http://368500.cn/vm/to.htm, http://saudieng.net/,
http://gmpg.org/xfn/11.
Malicious
Sources; Mali-
cious Outbound
Data/Botnets
http://3apa3a.tomsk.tw/c/cfg.bin, http://panazan.ro/online/libraries/pattemplate/patTemplate/Modifier/HTML/im/o/z/3pingo/gate.php,
http://panazan.ro/online/libraries/pattemplate/patTemplate/Modifier/HTML/im/o/z/3pingo/cfg.bin.
Malicious
Sources; Mali-
cious Outbound
Data/Botnets;
News-
groups/Forums;
Society/Daily
Living
http://floranimal.ru/articles/mashrooms/zh/cfg.bin,
http://www.hotspotshield.com/, http://twitter-
badges.s3.amazonaws.com/.
Continued on next page
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Table A.1 (continued)
Category Blocked Sites
Adult/Mature
Content; Shop-
ping
http://www.underworldfashions.com/,
http://lingerie.com/, http://exoticfashionmall.com/,
http://www.ignitethepassion.co.nz/, http://lingeriebowl.com/,
http://bodylingerie.com/, http://venusswimwear.com/,
http://victoriassecret.com/, http://abcunderwear.com/,
http://trashy.com/, http://blueskyswimwear.com/,
http://figleaves.com/, http://spikybras.com/,
http://freshpair.com/, http://panties.com/, http://mehzavod.ru/.
Adult/Mature
Content
http://www.wolfmarksden.com/, http://www.fanpix.net/picture-
gallery/0705289/csi-miami-pictures.html,
http://www.prettynudists.com/
Pornography http://udfn.com/, http://www.k-k-k.com/,
http://crazyshit.com/, http://desijammers.com/,
http://nudes.hegre-art.com/, http://www.nudistnudes.com/,
http://www.met-art.com/, http://www.nztop100.co.nz/,
http://tgpme.com/, http://vi5search.com/,
http://7chan.org/, http://www.avizoon.com/,
http://smsmovies.net/, http://ww42.proscribed.com/,
http://bangbus.com/, http://www.nudes-
nudes.com/, http://www.nudesfromdownunder.com/,
http://www.mc-nudes.com/, http://www.gmbill.com/,
http://xxx.com/, http://www.adultauctions.co.nz/,
http://www.retropornarchive.com/.
Adult/Mature
Content; Sex
Education
http://www.nzpersonals.com/, http://adultshop.nzpersonals.com/.
Continued on next page
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Table A.1 (continued)
Category Blocked Sites
Pornography;
Extreme; Scam/
Questionable/
Illegal
http://tiptopteens.net/.
Child Pornog-
raphy
http://sexual.vipzax.com/, http://risk.vipzax.com/.
Adult/Mature
Content; Place-
holders
http://nude.vipzax.com/, http://teens-models.org/.
Pornography;
Scam/ Ques-
tionable/ Ille-
gal; Suspicious
http://smalltopsite.com/.
Proxy Avoid-
ance; Suspi-
cious
http://www.vtunnel.com/.
Proxy Avoid-
ance
http://getmearound.net/, http://ooni.nu/,
http://www.hotspotshield.com/, http://www.ad-free-
proxy-site.info/, http://www.ad-free-proxy-site.info/,
http://www.anonymizer.ru/, http://tornadoproxy.com/,
http://www.fsurf.com/, http://getmearound.net/,
http://torproject.org/ http://www.vpnbook.com/,
http://www.justfreevpn.com/, http://www.hotspotshield.com/,
http://www.proxy4free.com/, http://proxy.org/,
http://proxyserver.asia/, http://exitb.net/, http://psiphon.ca/,
http://ultrasurf.us/.
Continued on next page
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Table A.1 (continued)
Category Blocked Sites
Peer-to-Peer
(P2P)
http://songbox.pk/, http://thepiratebay.org/,
http://kickassunblock.info/search/kickasstorrents/,
http://h33tunblock.info/, http://www.bittorrent.com/,
http://eztv.it/, http://www.torrentbytes.net/,
http://tracker.istole.it/.
Adult/Mature
Content; Ma-
licious Out-
bound Data/
Botnets; Per-
sonals/ Dating;
Chat/ Instant
Messaging
http://friendfinder.com/
Pornography;
Extreme
http://bbs12.mail15.su/, http://ourworldkids.info/, http://pretty-
pretty.info/, http://eroticaexpo.co.nz/, http://youngtop.info/.
Adult/ Ma-
ture Content;
Humor/ Jokes
http://www.lotsofjokes.com/, http://www.jokesgalore.com/,
http://www.jokesgallery.com/, http://dirtyjokesinc.com/,
http://collegehumor.com/.
Adult/ Ma-
ture Content;
Personals/
Dating
http://broonline.co.nz/, http://sxetc.org/
http://findsomeone.co.nz/, http://www.nzdating.com/,
http://w3.nzdating.com/, http://broonline.co.nz/.
Continued on next page
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Table A.1 (continued)
Category Blocked Sites
Gambling; Ma-
licious Sources;
Malicious Out-
bound Data/
Botnets
http://carsands.com/, http://www.poker.net/,
http://www.ildado.com/, http://sportsgambling.about.com/,
http://www.casinogamblingexposed.com/,
http://www.bjmath.com/, http://www.simslots.com/,
http://online-keno.com/, http://onlinegamblingtips.com/,
http://blackjackinfo.com/, http://keno-info.com/,
http://blackjackplaza.com/, http://bjmath.com/, http://blackjack-
gambler.com/, http://sportsgambling.about.com/%20h,
ttp://www.casinogamblingexposed.com/, http://ildado.com/,
http://roulette.sh/, http://gamblingnewsletter.com/,
http://allcraps.com/, http://pokerroom.com/,
http://planetpoker.com/, http://onlinecasino.com/,
http://poker.com/, http://homepoker.com/,
http://gamingday.com/, http://poker.net/,
http://4online-gambling.com/, http://gambling.com/,
http://www.nzlotteries.co.nz/.
Adult/ Mature
Content; Alco-
hol
http://moderndrunkardmagazine.com/.
Search En-
gines/ Portals;
Malicious Out-
bound Data/
Botnets
http://jihadonline.org/, http://www.megago.com/l/.
Adult/Mature
Content; Enter-
tainment
http://photos.lucywho.com/csi-miami-photos-t685904.html,
http://www.acephotos.org/t685904/csi-miami-photos.html.
Finished on next page
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Table A.1 (finished)
Category Blocked Sites
Entertainment;
Pornography
http://www.iheartchaos.com/.
hate speech http://americannaziparty.com/, http://stormfront.org/,
http://godhatesfags.com/, http://nsm88.com/,
http://nationalvanguard.org/, http://nationalist.org/,
http://jewwatch.com/, http://thebirdman.org/,
http://bhbulgaria.com/, http://martinlutherking.org/,
http://skrewdriver.net/, http://resistance-radio.com/,
http://armyofgod.com/, http://www.front14.org/,
www.sedoparking.com/feminista.com/.
Hacking http://hacktivismo.com/, http://nmrc.org/,
http://hackcanada.com/, http://cultdeadcow.com/.
Weapons http://collectiblefirearms.com/, http://guns.ru/pvo/,
http://uws.com/, http://aum-shinrikyo.com/,
http://zmweapons.com/, http://hecklerkoch-usa.com/.
Sex education http://condoms.getiton.co.nz/, http://www.sextherapy.co.nz/,
http://sieccan.org/, http://premaritalsex.info/%20,
http://www.ultimatebirthcontrol.com/, http://positive.org/,
http://plannedparenthood.org/, http://sfsi.org/,
http://scarleteen.com/, http://siecus.org/, http://teensource.org/.
A.2 Content blocking in organization 2
A sample of websites which lead to redirections is:
http://xtra.co.nz, and http://pretty-pretty.info/images/
js\_preloader.gif.
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A.3 Content blocking in organization 3
Table A.2 shows the results of content blocking tests at organization 3’s
wireless network.
Table A.2
Organization 3’s test results
Category Blocked Sites
Category blocked sites
Adult/Mature
Content; Vio-
lence/Hate/Racism;
Extreme
http://www.rotten.com/.
Adult/Mature
Content; Illegal
Drugs
http://www.shroomery.org/.
Malicious
Sources
http://warco.pl/, http://kremlinhotel.ru/js/jshttp/pha/seiko.php,
http://368500.cn/vm/to.htm, http://saudieng.net/.
Malicious
Sources; Mali-
cious Outbound
Data/Botnets
http://3apa3a.tomsk.tw/c/cfg.bin, http://panazan.ro/online/libraries/pattemplate/patTemplate/Modifier/HTML/im/o/z/3pingo/gate.php,
http://panazan.ro/online/libraries/pattemplate/patTemplate/Modifier/HTML/im/o/z/3pingo/cfg.bin.
Continued on next page
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Table A.2 (continued)
Category Blocked Sites
Malicious
Sources; Mali-
cious Outbound
Data/Botnets;
News-
groups/Forums;
Society/Daily
Living
http://floranimal.ru/articles/mashrooms/zh/cfg.bin,
http://www.hotspotshield.com/, http://twitter-
badges.s3.amazonaws.com/
Adult/Mature
Content; Shop-
ping
http://www.underworldfashions.com/, http://lingerie.com/,
http://exoticfashionmall.com/.
Adult/Mature
Content
http://www.wolfmarksden.com/, http://www.fanpix.net/picture-
gallery/0705289/csi-miami-pictures.html,
http://www.prettynudists.com/.
Pornography http://udfn.com/, http://www.k-k-k.com/,
http://crazyshit.com/, http://desijammers.com/,
http://nudes.hegre-art.com/, http://www.nudistnudes.com/,
http://www.met-art.com/, http://www.nztop100.co.nz/,
http://tgpme.com/, http://vi5search.com/,
http://7chan.org/, http://www.avizoon.com/,
http://smsmovies.net/, http://ww42.proscribed.com/,
http://bangbus.com/,0 http://www.nudes-nudes.com/,
http://www.nudesfromdownunder.com/, http://www.mc-
nudes.com/, http://www.gmbill.com/
Continued on next page
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Table A.2 (continued)
Category Blocked Sites
Adult/Mature
Content; Sex
Education
http://www.nzpersonals.com/, http://adultshop.nzpersonals.com/.
Pornography;
Extreme;
Scam/Questionable/Illegal
http://tiptopteens.net/.
Child Pornog-
raphy
http://sexual.vipzax.com/, http://risk.vipzax.com/.
Adult/Mature
Content; Place-
holders
http://nude.vipzax.com/, http://teens-models.org/.
Pornography;
Scam/Questionable/Illegal;
Suspicious
http://smalltopsite.com/.
Proxy Avoid-
ance;Suspicious
http://www.vtunnel.com/.
Proxy Avoid-
ance
http://getmearound.net/, http://ooni.nu/,
http://www.hotspotshield.com/, http://www.ad-free-
proxy-site.info/, http://www.ad-free-proxy-site.info/,
http://www.anonymizer.ru/, http://tornadoproxy.com/,
http://www.fsurf.com/, http://getmearound.net/,
http://torproject.org/ http://www.vpnbook.com/,
http://www.justfreevpn.com/, http://www.hotspotshield.com/,
http://www.proxy4free.com/, http://proxy.org/,
http://proxyserver.asia/, http://exitb.net/, http://psiphon.ca/,
http://ultrasurf.us/.
Continued on next page
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Table A.2 (continued)
Category Blocked Sites
Peer-to-Peer
(P2P)
http://songbox.pk/, http://thepiratebay.org/,
http://kickassunblock.info/search/.kickasstorrents/,
http://h33tunblock.info/, http://www.bittorrent.com/,
http://eztv.it/, http://www.torrentbytes.net/,
http://tracker.istole.it/.
Adult/Mature
Content; Mali-
cious Outbound
Data/Botnets;
Person-
als/Dating;
Chat/Instant
Messaging
http://friendfinder.com/.
Pornography;
Extreme
http://bbs12.mail15.su/, http://ourworldkids.info/, http://pretty-
pretty.info/, http://eroticaexpo.co.nz/, http://youngtop.info/
Adult/Mature
Content; Hu-
mor/Jokes
http://www.lotsofjokes.com/, http://www.jokesgalore.com/,
http://www.jokesgallery.com/, http://dirtyjokesinc.com/, no
problem with this site:, http://collegehumor.com/.
Search En-
gines/Portals;
Malicious
Sources; Mali-
cious Outbound
Data/Botnets
http://jihadonline.org/, http://www.megago.com/l/?.
Finished on next page
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Table A.2 (finished)
Category Blocked Sites
Adult/Mature
Content; Per-
sonals/Dating
http://broonline.co.nz/, http://sxetc.org/.
Gambling; Ma-
licious Sources;
Malicious
Outbound
Data/Botnets
http://carsands.com/,
Adult/Mature
Content; Alco-
hol
http://moderndrunkardmagazine.com/.
Pornography http://www.udfn.com/, http://xxx.com/.
Adult/Mature
Content; Enter-
tainment
http://www.acephotos.org/t685904/csi-miami-photos.html.
Entertainment;
Pornography
http://www.iheartchaos.com/.
A.4 Content blocking in organization 4
The list of blocked URLs in organization 4 is illustrated in Table A.3.
Table A.3
Organization 4’s test results
Category Blocked Sites
Continued on next page
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Table A.3 (continued)
Category Blocked Sites
Pornography;
Extreme;
Scam/Questionable/Illegal
http://tiptopteens.net/.
Pornography http://bangbus.com/, http://ww42.proscribed.com/,
http://smsmovies.net/, http://www.avizoon.com,
http://7chan.org/, http://www.nudistnudes.com/,
http://www.met-art.com/, http://eroticaexpo.co.nz/,
http://nudes.hegre-art.com/,
Adult/Mature
Content; Place-
holders
http://teens-models.org/, http://www.mc-
nudes.com/, http://www.nudes-nudes.com/,
http://www.nudesfromdownunder.com/, http://www.udfn.com/,
http://eroticaexpo.co.nz/, http://pretty-pretty.info,
http://crazyshit.com/, http://tgpme.com/.
Adult/Mature
Content
http://www.prettynudists.com/.
Adult/Mature
Content; Shop-
ping
http://exoticfashionmall.com/, http://lingerie.com/,
http://www.panties.com/, http://www.trashy.com/,
http://www.bodylingerie.com/, http://www.lingeriebowl.com/.
Adult/Mature
Content; Hu-
mor/Jokes
http://www.jokesgallery.com/, http://www.crazyshit.com/,
http://www.the-jokes.com/, http://justjoking.com/,
http://www.funnyjokes.com/.
Adult/Mature
Content; Alco-
hol
http://www.moderndrunkardmagazine.com/,
http://www.skyy.com/, http://www.beer.com/.
Pornography;
Extreme
http://bbs12.mail15.su/, http://ourworldkids.info/.
Finished on next page
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Table A.3 (finished)
Category Blocked Sites
Malicious
Sources; Mali-
cious Outbound
Data/Botnets
http://3apa3a.tomsk.tw/c/cfg.bin.
Pornography;
Extreme;
Scam/Questionable/Illegal
http://tiptopteens.net/.
Drug http://www.hightimes.com/, http://www.marijuanareform.org/.
Gambling http://www.casino.net/en/default.htm.
gay and lesbian http://www.tsroadmap.com/, http://transsexual.org/,
http://www.queernet.org/, http://www.gaycenter.org/,
http://www.gayegypt.com/, http://www.lesbian.org/,
http://www.bisexual.org/, http://lesbians-against-violence.com/,
http://gaytoday.badpuppy.com/.
hacking http://www.hackinthebox.org/
Adult/Mature
Content; Abor-
tion; Sex Educa-
tion
http://www.sxetc.org/, http://www.scarleteen.com/,
http://www.sfsi.org/, http://www.positive.org/,
http://www.sieccan.org/, http://www.teenpregnancy.org/,
http://www.nostatusquo.com/ACLU/dworkin/,
http://www.feminista.com/, http://www.agender.org.nz/.
A.5 Content blocking in organization 5
http://vi5search.com,
http://xtra.co.nz,
http://www.feminista.com/,
http://youngtop.info/.
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A.6 Content blocking in organization 6
The URls blocked in CBDfree WiFi are as follows:
http://youngtop.info,
http://prety-prety.info,
http://xtra.co.nz/,
http://feminista.com/,
http://www.igc.apc.org/Womensnet/dworkin/,
http://saudieng.net/,
http://www.avizoon.com/,
http://tiptopteens.com,
http://teens-models.org/,
http://www.feminista.com/,
http://sexual.vipzax.com/,
http://risk.vipzax.com/,
http://nude.vipzax.com/.
A.7 Content blocking in organization 7
The list of URLs which were redirected when we requested them is shown
below:
http://youngtop.info/,
http://xtra.co.nz/,
http://pretty-pretty.info/,
http://tiptopteens.net/.
The following Peer to peer URLs could not be seen at organization 7:
http://songbox.pk/,
http://thepiratebay.org/,
http://kickassunblock.info/search/.kickasstorrents/,
http://h33tunblock.info/,
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http://www.bittorrent.com/,
http://www.torrentbytes.net/,
http://tracker.istole.it/.
A.8 Content blocking in organization 8
The list of blocked URLs in organization 8 is shown below:
http://3apa3a.tomsk.tw/c/cfg.bin,
http://sexual.vipzax.com/,
http://risk.vipzax.com/,
http://nude.vipzax.com/,
http://pretty-pretty.info/,
http://thepiratebay.org/,
http://xxx.com/,
http://www.avizoon.com/,
http://tiptopteens.net/,
http://teens-models.org/,
http://ourworldkids.info/,
http://youngtop.info/,
http://www.feminista.com/.
Appendix B
Service blocking test results
In this appendix the detailed information regarding service blocking in
each of these organizations is given.
B.1 Service blocking test in organization 1
The results of port checking in organization 1 are given below.
It was not possible to connect to remote FTP servers (port 21).
It was not possible to connect to remote SSH server (port 22).
It was not possible to connect to remote SMTP servers (port 25).
It was not possible to connect to remote DNS servers (port 53).
It was possible to connect to remote HTTP servers (port 80).
It was not possible to connect to remote POP3 servers (port 110).
It was not possible to connect to remote RPC servers (port 135).
It was not possible to connect to remote NetBIOS servers (port 139).
It was not possible to connect to remote IMAP servers (port 143).
It was not possible to connect to remote SNMP servers (port 161).
It was possible to connect to remote HTTPS servers (port 443).
It was not possible to connect to remote SMB servers (port 445).
It was not possible to connect to remote SMTP/SSL servers (port 465).
It was possible to connect to remote secure IMAP servers (port 585).
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It was possible to connect to remote authenticated SMTP servers (port
587).
It was possible to connect to remote IMAP/SSL servers (port 993).
It was possible to connect to remote POP/SSL servers (port 995).
It was possible to connect to remote OpenVPN servers (port 1194).
It was possible to connect to remote PPTP Control servers (port 1723).
It was possible to connect to remote SIP servers (port 5060).
It was possible to connect to remote BitTorrent servers (port 6881).
It was possible to connect to remote TOR server (port 9001).
B.2 Service blocking test in organization 2
The results of service blocking in organization 2 are illustrated as follows:
It was possible to connect to remote FTP servers (port 21).
It was possible to connect to remote SSH servers (port 22).
It was possible to connect to remote SMTP servers (port 25).
It was possible to connect to remote DNS servers (port 53).
It was possible to connect to remote HTTP servers (port 80).
It was possible to connect to remote POP3 servers (port 110).
It was possible to connect to remote RPC servers (port 135).
It was possible to connect to remote NetBIOS servers (port 139).
It was possible to connect to remote IMAP servers (port 143).
It was possible to connect to remote SNMP servers (port 161).
It was possible to connect to remote HTTPS servers (port 443).
It was possible to connect to remote SMB servers (port 445).
It was possible to connect to remote SMTP/SSL servers (port 465).
It was possible to connect to remote secure IMAP servers (port 585).
It was possible to connect to remote authenticated SMTP servers (port
587).
It was possible to connect to remote IMAP/SSL servers (port 993).
It was possible to connect to remote POP/SSL servers (port 995).
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It was possible to connect to remote OpenVPN servers (port 1194).
It was possible to connect to remote PPTP Control servers (port 1723).
It was possible to connect to remote SIP servers (port 5060).
It was possible to connect to remote BitTorrent servers (port 6881).
It was possible to connect to remote TOR servers (port 9001).
B.3 Service blocking test in organization 3
The list of blocked and open ports in organization 3 is given below:
It was possible to connect to remote FTP servers (port 21).
It was possible to connect to remote SSH servers (port 22).
It was not possible to connect to remote Direct TCP access to remote SMTP
servers (port 25).
It was not possible to connect to remotee DNS servers (port 53).
It was possible to connect to remote HTTP servers (port 80).
It was possible to connect to remote POP3 servers (port 110).
It was not possible to connect to remote RPC servers (port 135).
It was not possible to connect to remote NetBIOS servers (port 139).
It was possible to connect to remote IMAP servers (port 143).
It was possible to connect to remote SNMP servers (port 161).
It was possible to connect to remote HTTPS servers (port 443).
It was not possible to connect to remote Direct TCP access to remote SMB
servers (port 445).
It was possible to connect to remote SMTP/SSL servers (port 465).
It was possible to connect to remote secure IMAP servers (port 585).
It was possible to connect to remote authenticated SMTP servers (port
587).
It was possible to connect to remote IMAP/SSL servers (port 993).
It was possible to connect to remote POP/SSL servers (port 995).
It was possible to connect to remote OpenVPN servers (port 1194).
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It was possible to connect to remote PPTP Control servers (port 1723).
It was possible to connect to remote SIP servers (port 5060).
It was possible to connect to remote BitTorrent servers (port 6881).
It was possible to connect to remote TOR servers (port 9001).
B.4 Service blocking test in organization 4
The result of service blocking test in organization 4 is given below.
It was possible to connect to remote FTP servers (port 21).
It was possible to connect to remote SSH servers (port 22).
It was possible to connect to remote SMTP servers (port 25).
It was not possible to connect to remote DNS servers (port 53).
It was possible to connect to remote HTTP servers (port 80).
It was possible to connect to remote POP3 servers (port 110).
It was not possible to connect to remote RPC servers (port 135).
It was not possible to connect to remote NetBIOS servers (port 139).
It was possible to connect to remote IMAP servers (port 143).
It was not possible to connect to remote SNMP servers (port 161).
It was possible to connect to remote HTTPS servers (port 443).
It was possible to connect to remote SMB servers (port 445).
It was possible to connect to remote SMTP/SSL servers (port 465).
It was possible to connect to remote secure IMAP servers (port 585).
It was possible to connect to remote authenticated SMTP servers (port
587).
It was possible to connect to remote IMAP/SSL servers (port 993).
It was possible to connect to remote POP/SSL servers (port 995).
It was possible to connect to remote OpenVPN servers (port 1194).
It was possible to connect to remote PPTP Control servers (port 1723).
It was possible to connect to remote SIP servers (port 5060).
It was possible to connect to remote BitTorrent servers (port 6881).
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It was possible to connect to remote TOR servers (port 9001).
B.5 Service blocking test in organization 5
The result of port checking in organization 5 is given below.
It was possible to connect to remote FTP servers (port 21).
It was possible to connect to remote SSH servers (port 22).
It was possible to connect to remote SMTP servers (port 25).
It was possible to connect to remote DNS servers (port 53).
It was possible to connect to remote HTTP servers (port 80).
It was possible to connect to remote POP3 servers (port 110).
It was possible to connect to remote RPC servers (port 135).
It was possible to connect to remote NetBIOS servers (port 139).
It was possible to connect to remote IMAP servers (port 143).
It was possible to connect to remote SNMP servers (port 161).
It was possible to connect to remote HTTPS servers (port 443).
It was possible to connect to remote SMB servers (port 445).
It was possible to connect to remote SMTP/SSL servers (port 465).
It was possible to connect to remote secure IMAP servers (port 585).
It was possible to connect to remote authenticated SMTP servers (port
587).
It was possible to connect to remote IMAP/SSL servers (port 993).
It was possible to connect to remote POP/SSL servers (port 995).
It was possible to connect to remote OpenVPN servers (port 1194).
It was possible to connect to remote PPTP Control servers (port 1723).
It was possible to connect to remote SIP servers (port 5060).
It was possible to connect to remote BitTorrent servers (port 6881).
It was possible to connect to remote TOR servers (port 9001).
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B.6 Service blocking test in organization 6
The result of port checking in organization 6 is given below.
It was possible to connect to remote FTP servers (port 21).
It was possible to connect to remote SSH servers (port 22).
It was not possible to connect to remote SMTP servers (port 25).
It was possible to connect to remote DNS servers (port 53).
It was possible to connect to remote HTTP servers (port 80).
It was possible to connect to remote POP3 servers (port 110).
It was possible to connect to remote RPC servers (port 135).
It was possible to connect to remote NetBIOS servers (port 139).
It was possible to connect to remote IMAP servers (port 143).
It was possible to connect to remote SNMP servers (port 161).
It was possible to connect to remote HTTPS servers (port 443).
It was possible to connect to remote SMB servers (port 445).
It was possible to connect to remote SMTP/SSL servers (port 465) .
It was possible to connect to remote secure IMAP servers (port 585).
It was possible to connect to remote authenticated SMTP servers (port
587).
It was possible to connect to remote IMAP/SSL servers (port 993).
It was possible to connect to remote POP/SSL servers (port 995).
It was possible to connect to remote OpenVPN servers (port 1194).
It was possible to connect to remote PPTP Control servers (port 1723).
It was possible to connect to remote SIP servers (port 5060).
It was possible to connect to remote BitTorrent servers (port 6881).
It was possible to connect to remote TOR servers (port 9001).
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B.7 Service blocking test at organization 7
The result of port checking at organization 7 is given below.
It was not possible to connect to remote FTP servers (port 21).
It was not possible to connect to remote SSH servers (port 22).
It was possible to connect to remote SMTP servers (port 25).
It was possible to connect to remote DNS servers (port 53).
It was possible to connect to remote HTTP servers (port 80).
It was possible to connectto remote POP3 servers (port 110).
It was not possible to connect to remote RPC servers (port 135).
It was not possible to connect to remote NetBIOS servers (port 139).
It was possible to connect to remote IMAP servers (port 143).
It was not possible to connect to remote SNMP servers (port 161).
It was possible to connect to remote HTTPS servers (port 443).
It was not possible to connect to remote SMB servers (port 445).
It was not possible to connect to remote SMTP/SSL servers (port 465) .
It was not possible to connect to remote secure IMAP servers (port 585).
It was not possible to connect to remote authenticated SMTP servers (port
587).
It was possible to connect to remote IMAP/SSL servers (port 993).
It was not possible to connect to remote POP/SSL servers (port 995).
It was not possible to connect to remote OpenVPN servers (port 1194).
It was not possible to connect to remote PPTP Control servers (port 1723).
It was not possible to connect to remote SIP servers (port 5060).
It was not possible to connect to remote BitTorrent servers (port 6881).
It was not possible to connect to remote TOR servers (port 9001).
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B.8 Service blocking test in organization 8
The results of service blocking in organization 8 are given below:
It was possible to connect to remote FTP servers (port 21).
It was possible to connect to remote SSH servers (port 22).
It was possible to connect to remote SMTP servers (port 25).
It was possible to connect to remote DNS servers (port 53).
It was possible to connect to remote HTTP servers (port 80).
It was possible to connect to remote POP3 servers (port 110).
It was possible to connect to remote RPC servers (port 135).
It was possible to connect to remote NetBIOS servers (port 139).
It was possible to connect to remote IMAP servers (port 143).
It was possible to connect to remote SNMP servers (port 161).
It was possible to connect to remote HTTPS servers (port 443).
It was possible to connect to remote SMB servers (port 445).
It was possible to connect to remote SMTP/SSL servers (port 465).
It was possible to connect to remote secure IMAP servers (port 585).
It was possible to connect to remote authenticated SMTP servers (port
587).
It was possible to connect to remote IMAP/SSL servers (port 993).
It was possible to connect to remote POP/SSL servers (port 995).
It was possible to connect to remote OpenVPN servers (port 1194).
It was possible to connect to remote PPTP Control servers (port 1723).
It was possible to connect to remote SIP servers (port 5060).
It was possible to connect to remote BitTorrent servers (port 6881).
It was possible to connect to remote TOR servers (port 9001).
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HUMAN ETHICS COMMITTEE
Application for Approval of Research Projects
Please write legibly or type if possible. Applications must be signed by supervisor (for student projects) and Head of 
School
Note: The Human Ethics Committee attempts to have all applications approved within three weeks but a longer period may 
be necessary if applications require substantial revision.
1 NATURE OF PROPOSED RESEARCH :
(a) Staff Research Student Research (tick one)
(b) If Student Research Degree Masterof 
Computer Science
Course Code COMP591
(c) Project Title: Invisible barriers
2 INVESTIGATORS:
(a) Principal Investigator
Name Shadi Esnaashari
e-mail address esnaasshad@myvuw.ac.nz
School/Dept/Group School of Engineering and Computer Science
(b) Other Researchers
Name Position
(c) Supervisor (in the case of student research projects)
Ian Welch and BrendaChawner
3 DURATION OF RESEARCH
(a) Proposed starting date for data collection May. 2013
(Note: that NO part of the research requiring ethical approval may commence prior to approval being given)
(b) Proposed date of completion of project as a whole SEP.2013
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4 PROPOSED SOURCE/ S OF FUNDING AND OTHER ETHICAL 
CONSIDERATIONS
(a) Sources of funding for the project
Please indicate any ethical issues or conflicts of interest that may arise because of sources of funding
e.g. restrictions on publication of results
N/A
(b) Is any professional code of ethics to be followed Y N
If yes, nameACM code of Ethics
(c) Is ethical approval required from any other body Y N
If yes, name and indicate when/if approval will be given
5 DETAILS OF PROJECT
Briefly Outline:
(a) The objectives of the project
Most organisations monitor and/or control use of the Internet through the use of logs and/or Internet 
filters. This monitoring/control is usually invisible, and staff are only aware of it if they try to view a 
website or use a service that is blocked. However, there is little information about what is being 
blocked, and the reasons for that. The goal of this project is to identify the types of sites and services 
that are being blocked, in different types of organisations, the reasons for the blocking, and the effects 
of this blocking. The project will also identify the extent to which Internet traffic is monitored and the 
ways in which these records are used. The project’s goal is to have a more informed policy debate 
about the need to block access to Internet websites and services, and its impact on people’s ability to 
access information they need.
b) Methodof data collection
There are different places in New Zealand which offer wireless internet access (Wifi) either free or paid
to their customers such as CBD free Internet which covers different places such as Newtown Library 
Zoo, Central Library, Water Front Zone, Wellington Airport and the Airport Flyer buses, TePapa
Museum, McDonnalds, Starbucks, and many small and independent cafes and restaurants are also 
providing free WiFi hotspots.
They claim that they are offering free Internet. By using a modified version of the Open Observatory for 
Network Interference (OONI) tool that I will run at their sitel, these networks will be investigated and the 
list of blockURLs and services will be prepared for all of these locationsin order to make it transparent 
for users.
After observation, managers of those specific organizationswhich offer free Internet will be interviwed 
forthe reasonsbehindcontent blocking.
I have aplan to collect data for 3 months. I willinterview the managers ofthe organizations for 1 
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month. After gaining their consent I will audio record their voice.
(c) The benefits and scientific value of the project
No-one in New Zealand has researched the restrictions in place on users of either paid or free Wifi 
services nor on the policiesused by organizations. 
(d) Characteristics of the participants
The focal participants in this study will bethe responsible people for implementing the content blocking
in those specific organizations.
(e) Method of recruitment
Inthe first part of my data collection, I will run the OONI software on-site. The sites will be selected by 
compiling a list of free and paid Wifi providers by consulting sources such as the Yellow Pages and 
directories of Wifi providers in Wellington. I will run theproject by myself.The main benefits of running 
the experiment myself is that I do not expose any third-parties to risks associated with accessing 
potentially blocked content and I can monitor the running of the tests directly to determine if there are 
any security or other risks that occur during the testing. 
In the second part, I will contact the people responsible for themanagement of the service. This will be 
done in person at the businesses by providing a letter containing an information sheet and if there is no 
customer representative, I will use resources such as the email contact details provided by the Wifi 
provider and/or use resources suchas the Companies Directory tosource contacts details for the 
owners of the companies providing the service. 
A draft of the email is as follows. 
Dear Sir/Madam,
I ama Masters student in Computer Science at Victoria University of Wellington. I am investigating the 
prevalance of content blocking on the Internet in some NZ organizations including yours. I have found 
a few blocked contents inyour organization. I would like to invite you to participte inan interview and
answer a fewquestions. The interview will take 30minutes.
Thank you very much in advance. I will be looking forward to hearing from you soon.
Regards,
Shadi Esnaashari
Postgraduate student
School of Engineering and Computer Science
Victoria University of Wellington,
New Zealand
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(f) Payments that are to be made/expenses to be reimbursed to participants
N/A
(g) Other assistance (e.g. meals, transport) that is to be given to participants
N/A
(h) Any special hazards and/or inconvenience (including deception) thatparticipants will encounter
There are two main risks/issues to consider:
1. We intend to carry out the testing first and inform the organisations afterwards. The rationale is that 
we are: (a) simply carrying out activities that an ordinary user might carry out; and, (b) if organisations 
are aware of our experimentsahead of time we may not be able to recruit participants and we are also 
interested in the difference between the perceptions of organisations with respect to their beliefs about 
what they restrict and the realities. 
2. The URLs used to test for blocking will be sourced from search engines where the URLs are 
generated for different categories - News, Banking, Adult sites, Hackings sites, Entertainment etc. We 
will source these by using search terms associated with these categories and using URLs returned by 
the search engine (with safe filtering disabled). These URLs are auto-generated and there is a 
possibility that the URLs may contain links currently blocked or monitored by the Department of Internal 
Affairs (DIA). It is impossible to check this ahead of time because do not allow individuals or 
organisations to check which URLs may or may not be monitored at a national level. 
3. After running the testing,I will provide the information sheet for the managersto ask for participation
(i)State whether consent is for:
(i) the collection of data Y N
(ii) attribution of opinions or information Y N
(iii) release of data to others Y N
(iv) use for a conference report or a publication Y N
(v) use for some particular purpose (specify) Y N
Attach a copy of any questionnaire or interview schedule to the application
(j) How is informed consent to be obtained(see sections 4.1, 4.5(d) and 4.8(g) of the Human Ethics Policy)
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(i) the research is strictly anonymous, an information sheet is supplied and informed 
consent is implied by voluntary participation in filling out a questionnaire for example 
(include a copy of the information sheet) Y N
(ii) the research is not anonymous but is confidential and informed consent will be 
obtained through a signed consent form (include a copy of the consent form and 
information sheet) Y N
(iii) the research is neither anonymous or confidential and informed consent will be 
obtained through a signed consent form (include a copy of the consent form and 
information sheet) Y N
(iv) informed consent will be obtained by some other method (please specify and provide 
details) Y N
n/a
With the exception of anonymous research as in (i), if it is proposed that written consent will 
not be obtained, please explain why
n/a
(k) If the research will not be conducted on a strictly anonymous basis state how issues of 
confidentiality of participants are to be ensured if this is intended. (See section 4..1(e) of the Human 
Ethics Policy). (e.g. who will listen to tapes, see questionnaires or have access to data). Please 
ensure that you distinguish clearly between anonymity and confidentiality. Indicate which of 
these are applicable.
(i) access to the research data will be restricted to the investigator
Y N
(ii) access to the research data will be restricted to the investigator and their supervisor 
(student research) Y N
(iii) all opinions and data will be reported in aggregated form in such a way that individual
persons or organisations are not identifiable Y N
(iv) Other (please specify)
(l) Procedure for the storage of, access to and disposal of data, both during and at the conclusion 
of the research. (see section 4.12 of the Human Ethics Policy). Indicate which are applicable:
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(i) all written material (questionnaires, interview notes, etc) will be kept in a locked file 
and access is restricted to the investigator Y N
(ii) all electronic information will be kept in a password-protected file and access will be 
restricted to the investigator Y N
(iii) all questionnaires, interview notes and similar materials will be destroyed:
(a) at the conclusion of the research Y N
or (b) 3yearsafter the conclusion of the research Y N
(iv) any audio or video recordings will be returned to participants and/or electronically 
wiped Y N
(v) other procedures (please specify):
n/a
If data and material are not to be destroyed please indicate why and the procedures 
envisaged for ongoing storage and security
n/a
(m) Feedback procedures (See section 7 of Appendix 1 of the Human Ethics Policy). You should indicate 
whether feedback will be provided to participants andin what form. If feedback will not be 
given, indicate the reasons why.
The participants will be given an option to receive the results of the study, 
(n) Reporting and publication of results. Please indicate which of the following are appropriate. 
The proposed form of publications should be indicated on the information sheet and/or 
consent form.
(i) publication in academic or professional journals Y N
(ii) dissemination at academic or professional conferences Y N
(iii) deposit of the research paper or thesis in the University Library (student research)
Y N
(iv) other (please specify)
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Signature of investigators as listed on page 1 (including supervisors) and Head of School.
NB: All investigators and the Head of School must sign before an application is 
submitted for approval
Date
Date
Date
Head of School:
Date
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School ofEngineering and Computer Science
Invisible barriers
Information sheet for managers
Researcher: Shadi Esnaashari
I am a Master's student in the School of Engineering and Computer Science at Victoria 
University of Wellington. As a requirement of this degree, I am doing a research study 
which leads to a Master's thesis. In my research, I am exploring what restrictions are 
placed on accessing websites and Internet services, and how these affect users. I would 
like to invite you to participate in this research study.
I have used your service twice this month and found that a number of URLs and/ or 
services are blocked. I would like to interview you and ask you to discuss the reasons for 
implementing censorship on those specific URLs and services. The interview will take no 
more than 30 minutes.
Participation in this study is voluntary. If you agree to participate, you can ask me to 
remove from the study any of your recorded talk for any reason. Also, you may choose to 
withdraw from the study at any stage until two weeks after the data collection is 
complete. If you decide to do so, you can contact me and any data you have provided 
will be removed from the study.
In my reports on this research, I will use pseudonyms for you in the study in order to 
keep your identities and responses confidential. Audio will be destroyed or returned to 
you after the research is finished. Written materials such as field notes and transcripts 
will be destroyed three years after the completion of my research. This allows for 
publication of the research in academic journals.
I will report on the research in a thesis which will be submitted to the University and 
deposited in the University Library.
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This research has been approved by the Human Ethics Committee of Victoria University 
of Wellington.
If you have any further enquiries regarding this research, please contact me or my two 
supervisors Dr. Ian Welch (email: ian.welch@ vuw.ac.nz) and Dr. Brenda Chawner
(email brenda.chawner@ vuw.ac.nz) at the School of Engineering and Computer 
Science and School of Information Management, Victoria University of Wellington.
......................................................................... ................................................
Shadi Esnaashari Date
(email: esnaasshad@myvuw.ac.nz)
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SchoolofEngineering and Computer Science
Consent Form for managers
Name of person: …………………………………………..
I have read the information sheet regarding this research and have had an opportunity 
to ask any questions about the research and have them answered to my satisfaction.
I understand that:
 taking part in this research is voluntary.
 I can withdraw from the study at any time until two weeks after the data 
collection is complete i.e. August 30, 2013.
 Shadi will keep the information I give confidential.
 no one except Shadi and her two supervisors will have access to the data.
 pseudonyms will be chosen to ensure confidentiality. 
 the information I give will be used by Shadi to investigate the reasons for 
blocking content in different organizations.
 participants will have access to the recordings ad could remove any part they deem 
inappropriate.
 participantswill be informedabout the finding of my research via email.
Please write down your email, if you would like to receive a copy of the findings 
of this research. 
Email: ………………………………
 the recordings will be destroyed by Shadi three years after this research is 
finished.
If I have any further concerns which require more explanation, I can contact Shadi or her
supervisors Dr. Ian Welch (email: ian.welch@ vuw.ac.nz) and Dr. Brenda Chawner
(email brenda.chawner@ vuw.ac.nz) at the School of Engineering and Computer 
Science and School of Information Management, Victoria University of Wellington.
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I agree to take part in this research.
Signature of Manager………………………………
Date………………………………
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Appendix F
Email to ask for interview
The following email has been used to recruit the interviewees:
Dear Sir/Madam,
I am aMasters student in Computer Science at Victoria University ofWelling-
ton. I am investigating the prevalence of content blocking on the Internet
in some NZ organizations including yours. I have found a few blocked
contents in your organization. I would like to invite you to participate in
an interview and answer a few questions. The interview will take 30 min-
utes.
Regards,
Shadi Esnaashari
Postgraduate student
School of Engineering and Computer Science
Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand
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Appendix G
Interview questions
The following questions have been used in the interviwes:
1. Please tell me about your main reasons for blocking access.
2. Would you maintain a list of blocked sites/services by your organiza-
tions?
3. How often would you look at them and revise them?
4. Could you tell me a little about the categorizations? Please tell me
who has chosen these categorizations ? How have they chosen these cate-
gories?
5. Are you aware that whether you have over-blocking or not?
6. Why are some dating websites open and some others closed? Are there
any people to check the lists regularly?
7. Have you hadmuch feedback about blocking access to these sites/services?
8. To what extent does your organization block access to Web sites or on-
line services such as ftp, ssh, and irc, etc?
9. Would you consider if people asked for unblocking some URLs? How
much time would it take to make decisions for unblocking?
10. Are staff in your organisation/users of your free WiFi aware that their
access to these sites/services is blocked? If not, why dont you make this
information available to them?
11. Have you considered any other types of solutions rather than imple-
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menting blocking?
12. Do you know that with blocking you prevent users from accessing
useful information?
13. Considering that people have access to 3G and the fact that they can
access the desired content, what is the reason for blocking?
14. Why would you not publish the list? If someone tried to access these
blocked websites, would there be any punishment for that?
15. Would you like to talk about anything else?
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